U.S. 72 Extension and Relocation in Alabama, Georgia and South Carolina

One thing that is truly missing across Appalachia and the Piedmont regions of Alabama, Georgia and South Carolina is proper east-west connectivity.  This is especially true north of I-20.  In particular, many have expressed for years the total lack of an adequate route connecting Atlanta and Huntsville.  Only two choices exist: a congested surface route along US 431 from Anniston to Huntsville leaving I-20 or a northern route crossing the Cumberland Plateau along a collection of entirely poorly marked and inadequate highways.  Much of that traffic follows the northern route to avoid the congestion of the southern route.  While the construction of such a route is decades away, the bigger problem is that no clear route exists connecting the two cities.  However, Google Maps has laid that out for us, and this route is not lost on the truckers that already use it.  While currently inadequate for major traffic, it is still built to adequate standards to become a U.S. route: a plan that hopefully will also emphasize the need to invest more in the upgrades of this route as well as improving the horrible east-west connectivity across North Georgia.

In addition, an oddity exists extending from Athens, GA to Rock Hill, SC in that a tri-state highway exists that just happens to carry the route number of 72: a hint that perhaps planners envisioned an eastward extension of US 72 that never actually happened.  This is highlighted by the fact that the number does not change in two states and that Georgia in particular placed the route under high priority with substantial upgrades from Athens to the South Carolina border.  In between are several very major routes that inexplicably only carry state route numbers.  If this route does not justify an upgrade in status to U.S. highway, then what does?

U.S. 72 at present goes through Stevenson, AL connecting Chattanooga to Huntsville, but the real need present is to connect Huntsville to Atlanta.  A simple fix to this portion of U.S. 72, including the portion through Stevenson, can allow U.S. 72 to be relocated to a much longer route of much greater need through large portions of Georgia and South Carolina than the present route in use today.

The U.S. 72 extension is a practical plan that would be handled in four phases.  They are as follows:

• The first relocates U.S. 72 in Northeast Alabama along several routes from Scottsboro to Adairsville in Georgia.
• Existing U.S. 72 north of Scottsboro would then become an extension of another U.S. route that currently ends in a very random place: U.S. 74.  
• The second extends U.S. 72 east from that terminus from Adairsville to Gainesville in Georgia transforming portions of GA 20 and almost all of GA 369 to a U.S. highway.
• The third portion basically connects the route to GA 72 in Athens via an overlap with US 129.  It then changes GA 72 and SC 72 into US 72 extending the highway from Athens to I-77 in Rock Hill, SC.  
• Due to GA's unusual rules with state overlaps of U.S. routes, GA 72 would become the unsigned state overlap equivalent (US 72/GA 72) thus creating the only instance where a U.S. and state overlap share the same number like it is in 46 other states.  
• A portion of US 72 will need to be located on SC 121 meaning existing SC 72 into downtown Rock Hill will need to be reassigned as US 72 Spur.
• The fourth portion would require new construction extending SC 72 to an eventual eastern terminus and reunion with US 74 in Monroe, NC.
• This portion would likely be limited access and will require a new bridge over the Catawba River
• It will most likely follow or parallel NC 75

The new U.S. 72 routing would follow the following routes:

PHASE 1: SCOTTSBORO, AL TO ADAIRSVILLE, GA

This route would follow the following state routes:

• AL 35 from existing U.S. 72 in Scottsboro to AL 40
• AL 40 from AL 35 to AL 117
• AL 117 from AL 40 to the Georgia State Line
• GA 48 from the Alabama State Line to U.S. 27 in Summerville
• Overlap with U.S. 27 from Summerville to GA 140 in Armuchee
• GA 140 from U.S. 27 in Armuchee to I-75 in Adairsville

Looking at Adairsville to Huntsville (I-75 to Huntsville), the proposed U.S. 72 route is chosen by Google despite curves, hills and slower speeds than the alternative through Chattanooga (Image from Google Maps).

However, what is MORE striking is that when the route is extended to Atlanta, this route is STILL preferred over all other alternatives.  This means that these lowly state routes are in actuality carrying U.S. highway traffic (Image from Google Maps).

PHASE 2: ADAIRSVILLE TO GAINESVILLE

This route would follow the following state routes:

• I-75 from GA 140 in Adairsville to GA 20 in Cartersville
• GA 20 from I-75 in Cartersville to GA 369 near Lathemtown
• All of GA 369 from GA 20 near Lathemtown to I-985 in Gainesville 

The route from Adairsville to Gainesville is clearly defined by Google matching up with typical truck routes of today.  It avoids windy GA 140 east of Adairsville instead following a portion of I-75 to Cartersville then following existing GA 20 and 369 to Gainesville (Image from Google Maps).

PHASE 3: GAINESVILLE TO ROCK HILL, SC

While less important than the two western legs, the need for the route extension further east is still viable.  It presents a badly needed east-west link for traffic as an alternative to traveling through Athens and as a means for bringing economic opportunity to parts of Northeast Georgia overlooked due to the lack of decent east-west routes.  The eastern phase also presents a unique and coincidental situation.  By sheer coincidence, GA 72 east of Athens is not only a major route but maintains its designation into South Carolina until its terminus in the southern suburbs of Charlotte.  U.S. 72 would ultimately assume this route replacing most of GA/SC 72 from Elberton eastward.

The route east of Gainesville is not so clearly defined, and part of this is due to a vital missing link east of Gainesville.  The connection and realignment of two county routes in Hall County would most likely correct this issue, but this does not necessarily mean that this correction is the most viable route.  Google analysis shows that three possible options are viable.  These options are:

1. Route U.S. 72 along existing U.S. 129 to Athens then along all of GA 72 east of Athens meaning a full U.S. 72/GA 72 overlap.
2. Route U.S. 72 along GA 98 from Maysville to Comer then along GA 72 east of Comer
3. Route U.S. 72 along parts of GA 51 and 17 from Gainesville to Elberton in conjunction with other shorter routes.

Option 1:

The first option utilizes only existing state routes.  It follows:

• U.S. 129 from GA 369 in Gainesville to GA 10 Loop in Athens
• GA 10 Loop from U.S. 129 to U.S. 29
• U.S. 29 from GA 10 Loop to GA 72
• All of GA 72 east of U.S. 29 creating the coincidental U.S. 72/GA 72 overlap

This route is obviously the most simple to execute, but it has a distinct disadvantage in that it does not allow traffic to avoid Athens.  This means that U.S. 72 traffic would be forced into congestion related to Athens instead of by-passing it along less traveled routes through smaller cities and towns.  It is the least preferred option for that reason, but it does effectively establish all of GA 72 as a U.S. route as well as linking existing GA 72 to other routes.  In this plan, GA 316 should become the state overlap of all of U.S. 72 to avoid confusion and because the route would still be "Highway 72".

Option 2:

This option is probably the most logical route giving a completely direct east-west link with the fewest turns.  However, it does require substantial upgrades and intersection realignments where it passes through Hall County.  It also will require a renumbering of the westernmost portion of GA 72 between Athens and Comer.  It follows:

• Old Cornelia Highway from I-985 to Joe Chandler Road (part of Old U.S. 23)
• Joe Chandler Road from Old Cornelia Highway to GA 52 
• GA 52 from Joe Chandler Road to GA 98 in Maysville
• GA 98 from GA 52 in Maysville to GA 72 in Comer
• GA 72 from GA 98/22 in Comer to South Carolina State Line

The GA 98 routing gives the most direct east-west route from Gainesville to Elberton helping drivers find a suitable alternate to driving through more congested Athens.  It also helps better locate larger cities such as Commerce and the small Madison County seat of Danielsville.  However, it faces limitations from the need for costly upgrades along the portion between Gainesville and Gillsville since the route follows existing county roads (Image from Google Maps).

Note that this route cannot be added as-is.  Several significant changes would have to be made to make it work.  First would be major upgrades to Joe Chandler Road.  This would include intersection realignments at GA 52 and Old U.S. 23 to make Joe Chandler Road the primary movement, lane widening on Joe Chandler Road, an intersection improvement with East Hall Road and completion of an already programmed bridge replacement.  In addition, both county sections would also become an extension/relocation of GA 98.  Also, two routes would have to be renumbered to make this work.  The first is existing GA 98 north of GA 52, which is recommended for a reassigned GA 207 (out of use for 30 years).  The second is the renumbering of existing GA 72 west of where U.S. 72 joins the route in Comer.  The route can no longer carry the GA 72 number under this plan due to excess confusion.  However, several good candidates are available.  These include:

• GA 316 eastward extension along part of GA 10 Loop and all of GA 72 including the portions overlap with U.S. 72
• Re-designation of GA 350 along all of GA 72 including the portions overlapped with U.S. 72
• Re-designate the existing parts of GA 72 not included in the new U.S. route as U.S. 72 Spur
• Designate existing GA 72 south of the proposed route and part of U.S. 129 west of Athens as U.S. 72 Alt
• Extension and relocation of GA 53 along GA 316 and part of GA 10 Loop to overlap all of GA 72 including the portions overlapped with U.S. 72.  Existing GA 53 south of GA 316 could be renumbered or transferred to local maintenance.

Option 3:

This option is the northernmost option and would offer likely the greatest benefit as an east-west alternate route.  However, the existing roadways were not designed to carry an east-west route and would thus require substantial reconfiguration to make work.  Most of this would be west of I-85.  This route includes:

• Old Cornelia Highway from I-985 to Joe Chandler Road (part of Old U.S. 23)
• Joe Chandler Road from Old Cornelia Highway to GA 52
• GA 52 from Joe Chandler Road to GA 323 in Gillsville
• GA 323 from GA 52 in Gillsville to GA 51
• GA 51 from GA 323 to GA 145 in Franklin Springs
• GA 145 from GA 51 to US 29/GA 8 in Franklin Springs
• Overlap with US 29/GA 8 from GA 145 to GA 17 in Royston
• GA 17 from US 29 to GA 72 in Elberton

The GA 51 routing is considered because at present it recommends routing traffic along a long overlap with I-85.  While this is an acceptable option, it provides no benefit for communities near the route and dumps addition traffic onto I-85 that is already congested.  However, the route shown here does not consider using county road such as Joe Chandler Road.  The map below shows the same route with the modifications including distance and time to show the advantage especially after upgrades are made (Image from Google Maps).

The second map shows the GA 51 routing removing the barriers presented with routing traffic along an existing county road.  However, the upgrades required west of I-85 are significant and costly compared to the second option that includes only upgrades to Joe Chandler Road (Image from Google Maps).

In addition to the corrections along Joe Chandler Road, significant intersection realignments would be necessary to make this new routing work effectively, handle truck traffic and save time in comparison with other routes.  These upgrades would include:

• Reconfiguration of intersection at GA 52 and GA 323 in Gillsville to make GA 323 the primary movement and/or construct a traffic circle.  If a higher speed option is chosen, this would require a short by-pass on the NW corner of the two routes.
• Reconfiguration of the intersection of GA 51 and GA 323 creating a new roadway on the SE corner of the intersection between the two routes.  The new roadway would close the existing GA 323 east of that point and would make GA 323 the primary movement requiring GA 51 traffic to turn off of the new road
• Realignment of GA 51 intersection at Historic Homer Highway (Old U.S. 441) in Homer to make GA 51 the primary movement
• Construction of a traffic circle at the junction of GA 51 and 145 in Franklin Springs
• An improved roadway connection in Royston possibly including the state takeover of Cook Street or a new southwest bypass
• The construction of a full diamond interchange at GA 17 and 72 in Elberton

PHASE 4: SOUTH CAROLINA EASTWARD: WHERE DOES IT GO?

From Elberton, the route would continue along GA 72 eastward to the South Carolina line.  In South Carolina, the following takes place

• Route in South Carolina follows all of existing SC 72 until SC 121 in Rock Hill
• From there, U.S. 72 overlays existing SC 121 from existing SC 72 to its eastern terminus at U.S. 21 with an overlap of U.S. 21 to end at I-77.
• Existing SC 72 into downtown Rock Hill would become U.S. 72 Spur
• An eventual eastern extension may one day be possible to end at U.S. 74 in Monroe, NC via a new roadway connecting NC 75 to SC 122
• This new roadway should be preferably limited access, especially on the new portions
• A southern route connecting U.S. 21 east of I-77 to NC 75 may also be considered

The map above shows where US 72 would end in Rock Hill (following SC 72 and 121) and the proposed eastward extension.  The northern route in magenta following SC 122 connects the road as a surface highway to NC 72.  The southern route forking off of US 21 would be a freeway or expressway on new alignment ending at an interchange with US 74 east of Monroe.  This new route would create a southern connector from fast-growing Rock Hill to US 74 east of Charlotte.

WHY IS THIS NEEDED?

Northern Georgia and Northern Alabama have been known for many years to have poor east-west connectivity and part of that is due to the lack of a single major route to prioritize upgrades along.  Travelers from Alabama to South Carolina north of Atlanta at present have not a single U.S. route other than mountainous U.S. 76 and rely on a confusing splicing of state routes.  In neither South Carolina nor Alabama have any corridors been developed along these routes with by-passes or four lane sections that are needed to better manage traffic leading to a lack of development along these corridors and dangerous traffic situations as large trucks are using inadequate roads.  This state routes have not been unified in any logical fashion, do not indicate badly needed turns, have not been upgraded in such a fashion to better manage long distance travel and receive weak funding priority due to their lowered status as regional state routes instead of major intrastate routes.  In addition, Georgia has also not added a single mainline U.S. route in over 50 years relying instead on state route "corridors" such as the 500 series GRIP corridors that do nothing but contribute to public confusion.  Fewer designations are needed, and major routes in the state should be part of the U.S. route system in the majority of cases with the GRIP designations dropped due to their needless overlaps of already present routes.  

In fact, the politics of GRIP corridors do not actually line up with route importance in this case.  While the Scottsboro to Adairsville route has the highest need, it has received low priority for improvements by both Alabama and Georgia who both effectively treat it as a regular surface state route.  For instance, GA 48 is shown as a minor arterial instead of major arterial and has received very low priority for upgrades.  In contrast, GA 72 from Athens to the South Carolina line is not only a GRIP corridor but shown as a major arterial.  Some portions are only classified major collector such as GA 369 in Forsyth and Cherokee Counties.  All portions of this route should be reclassified as major arterial along with a renumbering to U.S. 72.

WHAT ABOUT OLD US 72?

Most of U.S. 72 north of Scottsboro does not follow a logical east-west direction before becoming essentially an unnecessary overlap with U.S. 41 and U.S. 64 in Jasper east of I-24.  In Chattanooga, U.S. 72 unceremoniously enters city streets terminating at the exact western terminus of U.S. 76: two east-west U.S. routes ending into each other!  It's a logical fallacy that came as a result of extending routes without thought as to where they would terminate.  U.S. 76 itself is mostly overlapped with U.S. 41 west of Dalton making it extend miles beyond its logical western terminus, so U.S. 74 makes the most sense to replace it.  U.S. 74 at present ends at the junction of I-75 and I-24, but it is not signed past its interchange with I-75 near Cleveland.  By signing U.S. 74 and extending it westward along I-24, U.S. 74 can easily and cheaply replace U.S. 72 between I-24 in Jasper and AL 35 (proposed U.S. 72 relocation) in Scottsboro.  Better yet, extending U.S. 74 effectively ties two APD corridors together: Corridor K and Corridor V.  In no way is the importance of Corridor V diminished, and in fact U.S. 74 becomes effectively a longer route tying Huntsville to Cleveland, TN through Chattanooga.  This extension effectively eliminates at least two logical fallacies leaving only U.S. 76 to correct (which will likely come later since a new route is planned from Dalton to Trenton that could carry U.S. 76 on a better route).  It also better unites two corridors that function much like surface interstate highways.

Corridor K and Corridor V can be linked together in a logical fashion by simply extending U.S. 74 westward along I-24 to take over U.S. 72 up to the relocated portion in Scottsboro (Image from Google Maps).

WHY THIS IS BETTER

Moving U.S. 72 onto these major routes through Alabama, Georgia and South Carolina will only consolidate what people have already known for years, but the purpose will be better travel and hopefully greater emphasis on upgrading this very substantial yet substandard route.  Most sections of this route are long overdue for a major overhaul including four laning, interchanges, new by-pass sections and intersection relocations to better reflect traffic patterns.  Unclear routes also discourage economic activity in all of the cities along this route due to difficulties involved in shipping and commerce.  At this point, the plan is simply to add a number to existing roads, but the hope is that in the future it will improve the economies and connectivity of all cities along its route.  

Lessons Learned from Alabama's Captive County Fiasco: Advice for Virginia, North and South Carolina

Sometimes the best laid plans fail.  It is not from lack of results or lack of effort, but usually these plans fail because either just enough people are not happy with the results of that plan or the approach taken is not fair to all parties involved.  While the storm has quieted down at present in Virginia over devolution of its state controlled county road system, the battle still rages in South Carolina where the state has strongly considered devolving responsibility for at least half of its current state-owned road system mileage as a means of forcing counties and cities to fund roads that are not federal-aid thus are lower in regional importance.  While fair skies permeate the Mid-Atlantic states at the moment for state-controlled county roads, the devolution threat still looms in the coming years.  North Carolina's roads are also slipping in pavement quality, and Virginia still has a long climb back after neglecting to fund its road system prior to 2012.  Another outbreak of devolution mania is likely to ensue with neither North Carolina nor Virginia able to adequately meet the demands of these two fast growing states.  Although at least 35% of the roads are in poor condition in all three states, that doesn't mean the same bad idea used in 35 other states does not need to be adopted in these states.

Roads such as Simmons Gap Road (Rt. 628) pictured here in Albemarle County, VA have an uncertain future in terms of the state continuing to maintain their roads.  The debate over the state's role in what would otherwise be a county maintained road in other states is never over as long as states fall behind on maintenance and roadway improvements.

THE CAPTIVE COUNTY STORY: A LESSON IN FUNCTIONAL CONSOLIDATION FAILURES

Alabama's "captive counties" were born in a period of progressive fiscal policy where state involvement in local road maintenance was much higher than today.  While Alabama has larger counties than many other Southeastern states, these counties are still low in population and have a high percentage of residents with lower incomes.  How "captive counties" began was in the 50's when corruption on a local level was very rampant.  Instead of a countywide road structure where all road maintenance was centralized in one single unit, counties were continuously splitting up road responsibility across special road districts.  The result was that these counties began to accrue massive debt.  At the time, the state felt that the only strategy that would work was to take complete control of the worst counties thus unifying the counties' road responsibilities under state authority.  All equipment, facilities and employees were then seized by the state and the newly "captive" counties were required to pay the state their share of highway user revenues (known as a "bookkeeping fee") to maintain roads in their counties.  A portion of that fund was used to pay off the debt with the remainder used for the state to maintain county roads.  These captive counties also made the cities within captive meaning that all roads in the county taken over by the Alabama Highway Department (now ALDOT) included those within the municipalities Alabama Highway Department.

A map of the controversial "captive counties" in Alabama

When the state was through seizing its picks of captive counties, the total was 10 counties although one source has stated there were once 13 captive counties.  These ten counties included 9 in Northern Alabama and one in Southern Alabama.  The ten counties were Lauderdale, Colbert, Franklin, Winston, Lawrence, Cullman, Jackson, DeKalb, Cherokee and Baldwin.  Most counties were seized by 1955 with Colbert County seized in 1965.  When the counties became "captive", the status was always left open-ended to allow for an eventual return to local control after the debt was paid.  After that was accomplished, voters would decide via a referendum whether to "free" the counties to maintain their own roads.  A funny thing happened, though, in that this penal strategy for corrupt counties became popular: especially with county officials.  People began to see that the state was doing a better job than the counties were able to do for routine maintenance and subsequent referendums were not resulting in the turning back of those roads.  

The existence of captive counties was controversial from the start.  It was joined by a Dillon's Rule culture that made the state directly responsible for county needs, and even the "free" counties received maintenance from the state.  It is not known if there were voluntary contracts, but it does appear that aside from the 10 captive counties, that several other "free" counties still contracted part or all of their road maintenance services to the state at-will.  All of this irked many who believed that the system was patently unfair giving financial advantages to "free" counties, and this was enhanced by strong home rule advocates such as former governor Fob James.  Lauderdale County fought the hardest to reform the system, and a referendum was put forth in 1963 asking voters to take back their roads not even a decade after the system was adopted.  Moreover, the state did not permit counties to make any decisions or have access to funding on county roads captive to the state, and it was commonly said that funding formulas were placing captive counties at a disadvantage.  This was worsened by the cheap construction techniques used to pave captive county roads.  The system was dominated by roads paved with nothing more than a thin layer of double surface treatment (tar and gravel) that, while an improvement over dirt roads, got into bad shape quickly.  

 

With the state unable to raise revenues adequately to improve the worsening road conditions, the fight escalated 20 years after the system was created.  This imbalance of funding remains an issue today in the states that control county roads: the counties are either unable or unwilling to raise funds to help advance state work.  Some exceptions do exist in several counties in Virginia, however, who have created construction agreements that speed up road projects that would otherwise go unfunded.

In 1975, Lauderdale County came up with a solution for the Captive issue.  The way the system was structured gave no control to the counties in how money was spent.  The county proposed limiting the role of the state without being required to take over maintenance.  The idea was that the state would cede financial and planning authority for construction to the county while continuing to provide maintenance thus keeping the county "captive".  A similar strategy has been considered more recently in Virginia and South Carolina, and this common sense solution has continuously been shot down by legislatures and state DOT's absolutely and stubbornly hell-bent on devolution.  It was a sound solution that could have saved the system, but the idea slipped through the cracks.  State Senator James Lemaster was fighting on a different front pushing heavily for full local control to fix the substandard roads that were falling apart.  His strategy would ultimately prevail.  For some reason, the hybrid solution with the state providing routine maintenance only while the counties otherwise plan and construct as they choose has been nearly impossible to execute: perhaps due to unclear authority for the roads and the ease in which the state could dump that responsibility if they are only responsible for what amounts to essentially patching potholes and putting up signs.  Apparently high standards and real government efficiency absolutely constipate modern state governments who prefer chaos and passing the buck. 

So much for good ideas, of course.  Four years later, Governor Fob James expressed fiery opposition to anything but home rule for counties.  With enough support in the state senate, the counties were coerced into a compromise that resulted in the return of the captive systems to the counties.  For about a year, the state and county squabbled about how equipment, employees and facilities would be transferred and after an agreement was reached all 10 counties regained control of their roads.  Problem was that except for wealthier and more populous Baldwin County, the captive counties were mostly poor, rural counties.  This transfer of authority to the counties gave them more freedom, but it led to a definite decline in roadway standards.  These "free" counties were not able to magically provide the good roads that the local control advocates continued to champion.  In fact, road quality did not improve much at all until the late 1990's and in fact got worse.  In addition, the maintenance of traffic control devices worsened dramatically and has never returned to the levels it was when under state control.  ALDOT has also not been as consistent with signage given that they no longer have costs streamlined with more efficient processes that they did in the 70's.  Issues like this are completely ignored by home rule advocates who fail to address that most counties are structurally incapable of providing the same high standards, frequency of maintenance and uniformity from county-to-county that the state was able to provide and that the states suffer from highly fragmented road responsibility that lowers frequency and quality of maintenance on state routes.

This 2004 photo of County Road 275 in Cherokee County shows a typical rural "captive county" road.  Although this road pictured was a primary state route from 1971-1980, it was never improved from when it was a county road.  Note the terrible condition of the road, signs, lack of safety improvements and rough pavement condition long after this road was deeded to local control.  This road was not fixed until 2008.

Neglect of traffic signs remains a pretty common issue with roads in the former captive counties.  The counties have been either unwilling or unable to maintain traffic signs to the levels they were maintained under state control.  Everything was transferred to a local level whether the counties could handle it or not.  

Economies of scale and high standards are always the casualty of fragmenting road responsibility.  10 year maintenance schedules are replaced with 20 year ones.  More expensive and better materials are removed and replaced with cheaper, lower standard ones.  Professional expertise is lost and replaced with a small number of employees with little to no engineering support and very little oversight.  The roads start looking neglected, and the weeds get taller as the poorer counties are not investing in weed and brush control the way the state did.  A poorly run road agency almost never gets set straight, and this means that from county to county, maintenance is highly unreliable compared to a centralized system.  In the 1930's, it was well known that decentralized road systems were like this, but somehow that topic has disappeared from modern discourse.  Nevertheless, the return to local control did offer advantages in terms of pavement conditions especially as statewide revenues today do not keep up with demand and local governments were then free to use local sales and property taxes to pave roads, but should road quality be sacrificed for this?  Why can't we have it all?  Good standards, good roads.  Additionally, the state today provides far less to counties than it did in 1979.  In the late 70's, the state/county funding split was 45% state/55% county.  Today it is 80% state/20% county.  This change in role in terms of financing of roads is a likely reason the state abandoned its efforts, and this is also a reason that a return to full state control would not be possible nor practical if funded from a state level like it was before.  

CAPTIVE COUNTIES REVIVAL

The fatal error with captive counties was the refusal by the state to provide local financing options for road construction and maintenance improvements beyond state revenues.  If that issue had been resolved early on, quite possibly this road system could have been rescued and the home rule advocates would have not had a platform.  The view in 1955 was that counties were supposed to be relieved of all duties for roads by using only state forces and revenues, but that strategy failed as the state was steering funds away from captive county governments for other reasons coupled with a sharp decline in the state's spending power within that same time period.  The idea was that property taxes would no longer have to be used for roads in the initial North Carolina strategy, but the inadequate nature of state revenues proved that unless state taxes were raised very high that it is not possible for the state to adequately maintain county roads without significant local financing.  

Nevertheless, the fight was not over.  Many in the state legislature were fans of the captive system and thought it should be brought back for all but the most populous counties.  Despite the devolution tide of the 1970's, a very serious proposal was put forward in 1985 to take over all county roads in all counties except those with a population of over 100,000 residents.  That bill had mixed reviews, but it primarily had some pretty strong opposition from counties that had never before been captive.  The main opposition was that commissioners in the formerly "free" counties felt that the state had not done a good job in the captive counties nor were they doing a good job maintaining the state routes.  They did not trust the state and felt that their roads were in better shape than what the state could provide.  In truth, these county commissioners were both right and wrong at the same time.  This brings us to the issue of roads today in Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina but for the purpose of this post we will focus on Virginia.

VIRGINIA'S 93 CAPTIVE COUNTIES: A SIMILAR STORY WITH AN OUTCOME THAT COULD BE JUST AS DISASTROUS

Virginia's road system today has a lot in common with the captive counties in Alabama.  The state's secondary state highway system does not define its counties as "captive", however, since the vast majority of roads of this class are under state control.  However, the distinction is the same.  While the "captive" counties include all but two counties, these two free counties have a known financial advantage from the state in terms of funding per mile and access to local financing.  This is not lost on the other counties, especially the more populous ones, who basically have their hands tied and are unable to raise enough local revenues to make up for what the state is not providing.  It is truly depressing to cross from a secondary road onto a Henrico County road and see a narrow, pothole-filled chip sealed road widen into a smooth asphalt road with wide lanes.  Of course, what isn't considered by the home rule champions is the fact that both of these counties do not share any revenues with municipalities, have a massive sales and property tax base, and have much greater populations than these other counties.  Instead of forcing counties to take over the roads, why aren't they allowing every county to raise local funds to repair and construct roads that are then handed over to the state to maintain?  While some regional sales tax reforms have been created helping greatly, it is still insufficient to address the huge backlog of work that is needed.  Although the gas tax was raised, it is going to take a lot more to get the roads right.

In Virginia, the state has not kept up with modern traffic demands.  Until 1986, counties were forbidden from investing any resources into new road construction relying entirely on the state.  This put fast growing counties at a severe disadvantage by not allowing them to fund new road construction when state revenues were not sufficiently addressing substandard road conditions.  While counties across the state have been allowed more flexibility in terms of funding road improvements above what the state has offered, what the state has not provided is a dedicated and plentiful funding source for counties to use independent of the state.  The result has been a very low local investment in roadway projects while the state has done little to nothing to improve the secondary state roads.  Secondary state roads are still "local" roads.  If the counties wish to improve the roads beyond what the state provides, they should have a means of raising money to do so since they actually use these roads and thus directly experience hazardous conditions.  

Things came to a head in 2011 when the state of the secondary roads got so bad that the number of miles in poor condition jumped to around 50%.  This was a direct result of the state's low gas tax that was not adjusted for inflation and had not been raised since 1986.  State revenues continued to decline resulting in the continued deferment of maintenance, and most of this deferment was on the state's secondary system.  State funding for secondary roads fell to zero in 2012, and the former governor Bob McDonnell enthusiastically proposed a transfer of both construction and maintenance of all secondary state roads to the county governments.  His proposal was hotly contested leading to a compromise that ultimately led to an increase in taxes through wholesale gas taxes (replacing the excise gas tax), regional sales taxes and an increase in fees.  The result of this compromise was that the state's secondary system was at least temporarily rescued from devolution, but this road plan is still a band-aid that is not healing the problem, and ultimately gas taxes and other fees still had to be raised.  State funding is still not adequate to cover all local needs, and home rule advocates are still waiting like for the opportunity or a vocal political advocate to obtain a wide enough support to overthrow the centralized road system and replace it with 93 different road departments, mostly with shoddy standards.

Roads like this one in Loudoun County, VA need a lot of work.  While this road is functionally local, the fact is that the state is not providing enough funding to repave, repair or rebuild roads like this.  While the county should not be expected to take over maintenance of roads like this, local revenue sources should be expanded to assure that local matters are properly addressed.  However, Loudoun has proved capable of providing funds for construction that have made it possible to fix roads like this one (it was paved and realigned recently).  This does not mean, however, that Loudoun is capable of caring for those roads on a routine basis the way that VDOT does presently.

These two roads in unincorporated Falls Church are under state control, and they show how serious the backlog of maintenance became prior to the 2012 legislation.  The first road has since been repaired, but the second is still awaiting funding for repairs.  While the state is slowly catching up from zeroing out secondary road funds in 2012, it is not likely that roads in this condition will continue to be tolerated by county and state residents if funding does not remain adequate for maintenance.  The first is Wilson Blvd (Rt. 613) and the second is Peyton Randolph Drive (Rt. 2325).  While Wilson Blvd. was finally resurfaced early in 2015, this image demonstrates the difficulties that state politics can have on road funding.  Similar roads in nearby Arlington County where the state does not control county road maintenance are in better condition, but quite a few roads in Arlington are still in rough shape.  While having Fairfax County take over road maintenance is not being advocated here, the county having its own funding sources to repair roads like this when state revenues fall short are definitely necessary as a means of continuing a centralized road maintenance strategy.

The question was again placed on the ballot in the governor's race in 2013.  Ken Cuccinelli's platform was to turn all secondary state roads to the counties.  Terry McAuliffe's was to keep the road system as it is with more funding.  The very close race resulted in the anti-devolution candidate winning the election, and he has recently pushed for a further gas tax increase.  However, Virginia's governors only serve one term.  The next election could easily result in a political conservative similar to Cuccinelli succeeding and thus again pursuing devolution.  If Virginia is going to pursue devolution, the Commonwealth should consider a better strategy than his full-scale graduated transfer plan.  Several options are discussed in the proposals section of this blog.

 

A NOVEL OPTION FOR VIRGINIA COUNTIES TO RESCUE THE SECONDARY SYSTEM

 

Devolution doesn't have to be to the counties.  It can just be transferred to another large highway agency.  Let's say that in this next election that Youngkin becomes governor and devolution is something he is hell-bent on.  The counties don't have to take it.  They have an option before it's too late, and that is a counter-proposal to create a statewide cooperative that essentially "receives" the secondary roads.  Call it the "Virginia Local Roads Commission" or "Virginia Regional DOT".  Unlike the secondary system, this will be a statewide DOT owned collectively by all of the counties and will work on their behalf to oversee all construction and maintenance essentially keeping the secondary roads and not forcing counties to take on engineering and maintenance individually.  This can even be managed privately in lieu of setting up a statewide office for it like VDOT.  It can be a win-win that will set a precedent.  The cooperative, if broadly participated enough, could be drilled down into four units: a rural statewide one and one for Greater Richmond, Hampton Roads, and Northern Virginia as long as the population of each exceeds 1 million residents.  This fits into the regional roads plan in that the roads of regional importance vs. statewide importance are still centralized, but they are funded and managed separate from the primary route system.

WHY VIRGINIA'S STATE CONTROLLED SECONDARY STATE SYSTEM WILL FAIL IF IT IS NOT REFORMED

It is important to consider that Alabama's failed "captive county" program provides some lessons for Virginia. The lessons learned from Alabama's "captive counties" included the following:

• The state does some things better than counties and counties do some things better than the state
• State control of county roads does lead to better routine maintenance standards than what counties are able to provide, because:
• It is engineer-driven with engineers always making road decisions
• It has clearly written standards that must be followed
• Has a stronger organizational structure that better enforces standards
• Has high economies of scale and purchasing power allowing more expensive materials to be purchased in bulk and at lower unit cost
• However, states do not have the revenues or organization to properly fund road construction off of the federal-aid road network resulting in a construction backlog
• Significant local funding matches are essential to fund proper maintenance of roads off of the federal-aid eligible road network, and local funding matches are weak to non-existent in most counties
  
• State revenues alone are not enough to keep up with needed local road improvements resulting in deferment of paving and other road projects 
• Local governments need a guaranteed source of revenues to fund road construction, and those funds must be used only for transportation purposes on secondary state roads
• When local governments can chip away at the construction backlog and speed up completion of maintenance projects, state revenues will then be adequate for routine maintenance and maintenance costs will be manageable with less reactive and more proactive work
• Deferred maintenance has a snowball effect due to the much higher cost to replace failed roads
• A perception exists that the state is using state-controlled county roads as an ATM by diverting maintenance funds to pay for larger road projects due to a lack of transparency on how funding is spent
• The truth is that the state revenues are inadequate to maintain such a large system without a local funding source, and the result has been an extremely high amount of narrow, cheaply paved roadways that are hazardous for all types of vehicles
  
• Like Alabama, Virginia has given "free" counties an unfair advantage in state payments.  Captive Counties in Alabama were also shortchanged
• Payments to free counties should be modified with the condition that the counties provide routine maintenance of state-owned roads within those counties (excluding traffic control)
• Replacing local control with a regional system as a steward working on behalf of all counties would resolve this imbalance while preventing the 95 counties, 95 different standards problem
  
• Full state ownership of county roads potentially reduces the funding available for improvements on the primary state highway system unless state revenues are kept at a very high level meaning higher state taxes
• State DOT's use this as a justification for devolution in that they believe state-aid road funds should be primarily for roads of greatest statewide importance
• However, primary routes are still adequately funded in the consolidated system
• If state agencies feel this is the case, then the state should employ one of two options:
• The first is to steer secondary funds uniformly to all county agencies with the intention that the counties that want to remain under state control have the state retain that funding as an "operations fee" with the local governments given a receipt each year showing how that funding was spent
• The second is for the state to steer all engineering and maintenance responsibility to a separate statewide cooperative agency working on behalf of the counties and let each member county decide how to finance operations and maintenance
  
• This approach balances out the "unfair advantage" in the "free" counties
• Critics say state government is not accountable to county voters thus is more likely to ignore needs of a local nature
• States have actually been very good stewards to counties in a centralized system, and they have done as good as they can with limited funding creating a very high level of efficiency, but with inadequate funding they are unable to modernize the roads or resurface roads frequently enough
• Giving local governments extra funding options through local option sales taxes, local option gas taxes, impact fees and/or ad valorem fees that can only be spent on transportation are necessary to provide local governments a way to fund construction and speed up maintenance projects regardless of whether the state remains in charge of local roads
• This way the state is a partner to local governments instead of a large, remote agency sending state money elsewhere
• Giving local governments funding options is NOT intended to be a devolution strategy.  It means that the local government finances improvements that are returned to to the state DOT upon completion for maintenance

These lessons are on display today as Virginia's approach to state control has led to not only substandard pavement conditions but also substandard roadway construction.  Roadways across the state are very outdated in design with narrow lanes, little to no shoulders, poor geometry, unsafe bridges, flooding problems and poor drainage.  Many of these roads were paved in the 1940's and 50's and have recurring maintenance problems requiring far more frequent resurfacing to keep in good condition.  In urban areas, the state has not provided badly needed intersection improvements, traffic lights/traffic circles, lane widening, sidewalks or other needed upgrades to provide safe and well-designed roads that match the heavy traffic volumes.  These are typically needs more likely to be championed by the local government, and local governments already spend as much as they are capable on secondary road construction projects.  However, the states are generally unwilling to raise the gas tax statewide.  Some options Virginia could choose from to give counties leverage over construction include:

1. 3-5 cent local option gas tax increase
2. 1/2 to 1 cent sales tax
3. Impact fees on new construction (only useful in high growth counties)
4. Ad valorem taxes (not to be confused with vehicle property taxes)

State control of everything from interstates to cul-de-sacs is a problem, because it is essentially a commingling of funding for both highways and local roads with very different priorities.  The way around this is the partnership model whether it is:

• The state continues to manage county roads, but local funding is provided and employed to complete what the state is unable to fund directly essentially expanding what already exists in a handful of counties in the state
  
• County roads are managed statewide through a cooperative "regional" system, but separate and independent from VDOT turning "secondary roads" into "regional roads" where engineering and oversight never actually does transfer to the local level even if primary financial responsibility does
  

Otherwise, funding for statewide needs will always compete with local needs with too little done to mitigate safety problems, maintenance problems and traffic bottlenecks on local-level roads.  Overall, the possibility of any significant state investment in operational improvements on secondary roads is quite low while the counties by and large are not able to steer enough of their own resources to begin the long and expensive work required to bring these roads to modern standards.  In fact, the majority of road work funded by the counties comes in the form of new construction.  A hybrid approach is the solution for that.

Local Examples of the State-Local Hybrid Approach

With these options, the county would have substantial funding to construct and maintain roads, BUT that does not mean that they take over maintenance.  Consider if Fairfax County, VA used a 1/2 cent sales tax to fund widenings and roadway reconstruction, and raised a 3 cent gas tax to fund the operations fee to pay back to VDOT for maintenance.  This way, the county actually is "maintaining" the roads, but they continue to trust the expertise of VDOT for routine maintenance while enjoying the economies of scale available from using a cooperative approach with the state.  VDOT would still budget the same amount as they did to Fairfax County, but the county would fill in the gaps.  In essense, the state did raise more money, but they entrusted it on a local level with it transferred back to the state based on the needs of the county.

Consider Loudoun County, VA.  How is Loudoun different?  For one, they are heavily involved in construction and often use impact fees as concessions from developers to pay for significant road projects and other infrastructure upgrades.  Thus, the county has successfully kept up with growth demands in places of heavy new construction as historic trails have to be quickly realigned to accommodate suburban sprawl.  The problem is, most of the functionally local roads that the county is not fixing are still in very poor condition.  Loudoun clearly needs more money as they are faced with the need to rapidly pave hundreds of miles of gravel roads, reconstruct others and modernize the county to meet growth demands.

Roads such as this in Loudoun County were only recently paved, but state funding was inadequate for this project.  It was paid for mostly by county funds then left to VDOT for maintenance.  It is considered a "rural rustic road" thus the narrow lanes and hilly geometry.  The county has routinely had to pave to this lower standard due to lack of funds to properly reconstruct roads.

Images such as this scene in Loudoun County highlight the depth of the construction backlog.  The county still has a large number of gravel roads, single-lane low-water bridges and roads with poor geometry that need to be completely realigned, widened and rebuilt.  You can see the state did a good job of warning of the hazards this bridge presents, but when it comes to construction this and many other counties in Virginia need better access to local financing to modernize potentially deadly roads such as this one.

While the county still enjoys and has no interest in ending their partnership with VDOT for maintenance of local roads, the county clearly needs additional local funding sources to modernize roads that cannot be improved with impact fees.  What if they could raise a local sales tax?  The county has substantial retail including a popular outlet mall.  If Loudoun was able to speed up improvements and catch up with the state's massive backlog, maybe VDOT would have an easier time maintaining what is already there.  VDOT is clearly capable of providing the basic outfit (resurfacing of major secondary roads, traffic control maintenance and summer/winter maintenance), but they are not fixing many roadways that remain in poor condition, paving new dirt roads or reconstruct shoddy-built roads.  It is the county that is mostly doing this.  If the county was able to get the county's roads up to state standards, pave every dirt road and rebuild every road in poor condition maybe then VDOT's available funds would be sufficient to maintain Loudoun's complicated road system. 

HOW TO REFORM VIRGINIA'S ROAD SYSTEM: DEVOLUTION ALTERNATIVES

Nobody involved with roads in Virginia denies that the future of state control looks sketchy for the state's secondary highway system.  Obviously the 2013 compromise provided flexibility to the counties and improved state funding, but VDOT was already so far behind from years of deferred maintenance and construction that more is needed to catch up.  Cheaply built roads with poor drainage cost more to maintain, and a vast program is needed to not just better maintain the roads that are there, but also to do more to modernize roads in the more populous counties.

Secondary route reconstruction such as Rt. 603 (North Fork Rd) in Montgomery County to modern highway standards as well as improvements to non-federal-aid secondaries is needed at much higher levels than is presently occurring across the state.  This cannot be done unless a new local funding source is identified.

The vast sum of winding and extremely narrow roads is not just limited to rural counties.  Counties around Richmond, Northern Virginia and Charlottesville that have a much larger population also are full of these substandard roads, and these roads do have traffic volumes that justify reconstruction.  Counties such as Stafford have been using their own available funds to begin reconstructing secondary roads, but what they have been able to accomplish is still a drop in the bucket compared to what is needed.  Traffic volumes on major roads are worsened when the secondary options discourage through traffic.  Improvements to these roads are vital for safety and economic progress.  Voters and legislators are not likely to continue to tolerate roads with terrible pavement, poor sight distance and inadequate design for decades to come.  In fact, it seems that the only roads that the state does an acceptable job maintaining are the federal-aid collectors and arterials both primary and secondary.  However, turning roads to the county is a proposition likely to result in a sharp decline in engineering and traffic control standards in most counties across the state.  Much of Virginia remains rural and will not have the resources to maintain their own roads to state standards regardless of available funding.  In addition, urban counties are not always reliable in funding and maintenance of roads as is evidenced in Montgomery County, MD.  

The solution lies in an approach where the state's role is diminished but not eliminated.  What went wrong in Alabama was that the state's role was completely eliminated.  Instead of adopting Lauderdale County's plan of keeping the state for routine maintenance only, the state completely exited the county road business.  The 1985 state takeover plan also did not include a provision to limit the state's powers, thus why it failed.  The key word is control.  The state's control structure will only work if local governments have broader funding and powers in road construction and maintenance on secondary state roads.  This means that the strategy must change.  However, a strategy of cooperative services with the state handling technical services and routine maintenance on account of the local governments should never change.

Another post details the devolution alternatives for both Virginia and West Virginia with specific details.  It lays out the specific strategies that should be adopted

ROAD PLANS ON THIS SITE THAT ADDRESS THIS ISSUE IN VIRGINIA

The most ideal solution is to keep VDOT in control of the roads they have controlled since 1932, but to allow local governments the ability to raise their own gas or sales taxes to speed up maintenance projects and finance far more road projects than the state can presently afford.  It is clear that not only is much more needed with reconstructing roads, but also to create roads that are safer for both motorists and pedestrians.  Primitive, narrow and winding roads with heavy traffic are a hazard for everyone that uses them, and local governments should not have to beg for help when the state has so many conflicting priorities.  Give the local governments the option to fund more road projects, but do not punish them for doing so by forcing them to take over road maintenance.  If this is still not possible, then perhaps in more populous regions of the state it might be time to consider developing a regional road system like the ones proposed in the Regional Roads Plan.  Some other ideas that might also help to fix this imbalance are as follows:

• Traffic Control Cooperative Plan
• Loudoun County certainly demonstrates that the state does some things better than the counties and the counties do some things better than the state.
• Nowhere is this more true than with traffic operations
• Local governments as a whole are not financially nor structurally suited to handle this technical operation that is too expensive to correctly administer without high standards, without high economies of scale and without a specialized agency that has a PTOE supervising engineer
• Even if a county otherwise does an excellent job maintaining roads, they typically do a terrible job with traffic control
• This is why even if road maintenance otherwise is transferred to a local level, this specific state function should remain under state control or transferred to a cooperative with state funding.
• Statewide Contracting Plan
• If VDOT exits the county road business, this responsibility should not fall directly on the county governments
• Instead, interested counties and municipalities broker a deal to either allow secondary roads to transfer into a new state agency or to form their own interagency cooperative that handles secondary roads keeping VDOT as a contractor while the organization is being formed.
• The state could also step in and address the concerns of local agencies by developing a separate state agency to handle local roads or a joint cooperative among all interested partners needs to replace this that would keep roads consolidated, but separate them from VDOT
• The cooperative could co-locate facilities with VDOT, share equipment and operate as a statewide unit that just happens to be under the authority of the 93 counties formerly under state control.
• The idea is that if counties must take over roads that they will NOT be required to set up separate road systems in each county.
• This plan creates a balance and a safety net if the state forces the hand of the 93 counties across the state who have enjoyed relief from the higher costs associated with full local control
• Farm-To-Market Cooperative Highway System Plan
• This approach reduces, but does not eliminate VDOT's role of maintaining secondary roads
• VDOT keeps partial control of the secondary state highway system with state control reduced to around 35-45% of the road network
• Construction costs are passed on to counties and municipalities for all other roads
• All counties can either retain VDOT as a contractor at their own expense for remaining roads or form a regional/statewide cooperative that ultimately assumes maintenance responsibility for both local and farm-to-market roads
• Two-Way Consolidated Road Maintenance Plan
• A major goal in Virginia should be to keep the historic consolidated road system consolidated, but with reforms to provide a degree of local control that has not previously been available
• If all secondary roads are transferred to county authority for construction, that doesn't mean that the county and state should operate separately
• Obviously two counties both construct and maintain their own road systems and others may soon join them such as Chesterfield County
• If that's the case, then the counties should be given the same responsibility as cities: maintenance of state-owned roads
• Perhaps this arrangement could be set up like the Local Exchange Plan with the state providing traffic operations work on local roads in turn for the county providing all other routine maintenance on state-owned roads even if it is not a match dollar for dollar
• In this plan, either the county works for the state or the state works for the county.
• Populous counties would benefit consolidated local maintenance of county and state routes while less populous counties could retain VDOT as the exclusive steward of both state and local roads

SUPERVISION OF STATE AND LOCAL ROADS NEEDS TO BE RESTRUCTURED INTO A CO-OP MODEL

The idea that either a state or local government agency should have total control of their own systems without any overlapping of duties or sharing of services is an antiquated and inefficient concept.  Most states today are too large to handle all local matters while most counties and municipalities are too small to handle matters that the state handles best.  This is why the captive county system failed in Alabama and why Virginia's secondary state highway system is also in danger of failing.  Local control is not a bad thing as long as it is understood that local governments cannot handle everything on their own.  The whole idea of local control is to make sure that local funding stays at home and that how that money is spent is accountable to local voters.  However, this does not mean that local government is either responsible or efficient to the degree that it actually works that way in every case.  As was said before, we need to think regionally, not locally.   Thinking regionally means that the gray area is explored as a solution either with an overlapping service structure between the states and local governments or the development of a regional governance model for transportation that places significant road responsibility on a level above the county or municipality but below the state: in other words, a state within a state.

In all, the lessons learned from Alabama demonstrate that balance is needed.  Balance did not exist when the Alabama Highway Department (now ALDOT) managed the captive county roads, and balance does not exist today with the counties maintaining those same roads the state handled back then.  Local agencies need to understand that opposing a transfer to the local level will not be enough to stop it from happening.  Instead of ignoring the problem or turning back to the bad old days, local agencies are provided here with tools that give them the power to stop devolution by thinking outside the box for new funding allocation methods, new organization structures and elimination of the belief that local control on a county of municipal level is the solution to a construction and maintenance backlog.  Other local agencies in decentralized states also need to understand that they can enact centralization by adopting a similar strategy to what is described above.  While it is generally the duty of a state to delegate responsibilities to local governments, time and history have proven that not all local agencies are the same and that what is best for some may not work as well for others.  Roads should not be fully centralized nor should they be completely local.  Both agencies need each other's help, and the best way to do this is to allocate the responsibility in a way that is the most beneficial for all parties.  

Shoddy Signs Spotlight: Morgan County, AL

Morgan County is a moderate population county located to the south of Huntsville.  With 119,490 residents, the unincorporated county has over 40,000 residents with its largest city Decatur dominating the county in population serving as a bedroom community for Huntsville.  Considering its population, most people would think that traffic safety improvements would be excellent.  They would be wrong.  Quite possibly no county has surpassed Morgan County, AL in atrociousness when it comes to traffic sign standards.  This is unfortunate considering that the county otherwise appears to otherwise have an excellent road system.

The first photo is on Lando Cain Road southbound where it transitions into East Byrd Road via a 90 degree turn.  This atrocity is what you see as you come up to that dangerous turn.  A street name sign is posted on top of the curve sign for a particularly confusing experience.  Additionally, a single off-center chevron with the curve sign in the middle of the sharp turn are all that greet drivers.  There should either be at least two chevrons visible from each direction or large arrow signs (W6-6). Westbound in the second photo only a (very incorrectly designed) curve sign is posted.   As to the curve signs, this appears to be a contractor purchase that wasn't inspected to make sure that what they were buying was MUTCD-compliant.  Granted you could shoot into either driveway if you miss the curve, but most drivers would be close to highway speed before being surprised by the severity of this curve an otherwise arrow-straight road.  Because of that, the risk of hitting a car coming from the other direction is pretty high (Photos from Google Street View, June 2014).

This is the intersection in question from Google Maps

The issues with the signs are quite numerous.  Extremely poor traffic engineering is the tip of the iceberg.  The design of nearly every warning and regulatory sign is completely wrong, maintenance is poor, post height is incorrect and what signs exist are rather sparse.  Furthermore, county routes still appear on maps, but signage has completely disappeared even though these county routes have not been assigned or posted with names.  Street name signs also do not meet MUTCD standards and do not include cross-street names meaning traffic coming from a side road will need GPS to even know what road they are approaching.  How can a county that otherwise has smooth, well-built roads have such poor management of traffic signs?  This is the county paradox, and this is why safety improvements as a whole are something that should typically not be handled from an individual county or municipal level with exception to a few high income, high population areas.  Reason would say that you would be punishing the ones that do it right, but clearly self-policing does not work, and if those "good ones" know something that this county does not, then that knowledge needs to be shared in a way that changes are permanent and for the better.

These winding road signs are just two examples of poorly designed signs pandemic around the county.  Both are atrociously designed and do not comply with the MUTCD located on County Road 55: a major collector road.  Note that the post height is less than 5' on the first sign and that both signs are 24" x 24" on a major road with a 45 MPH speed limit (both signs are required to be 30" x 30").  Also note that the road curves to the left.  This is actually a left reverse curve, not a right winding road.  The second sign was witnessed in other counties suggesting a contractor that was not properly vetted for compliance.  The first image is on CR 55 eastbound west of Fowler Road and the second on CR 55 westbound west of Chambers Ln (Google Street View, September 2013).

Curve in question on Google Maps.  It's fairly obvious from here it is a left reverse curve not a "winding road".

It should be noted that this county does have an engineer, and this engineer clearly has no interest in this aspect of the county road system.  However, is this engineer a PTOE?  Alabama has provided county engineers, but nobody like this for traffic control.  Otherwise, it would be much better.  Obviously no traffic study has been conducted on any of these roads or there would be advisory signs under the curve signs, signs would be posted at the correct height, signs would be in the correct place and the signs would look like standard signs.  If nothing else, an engineer's right to oversee any county road system when funded by the state should rest on the engineer's compliance with state standards for safety improvements, but preferably the county engineer should not be wearing "many hats" with something like traffic control being a side job, which is clearly what is going on here.  Clearly Alabama has no mandate that counties and cities follow these standards despite providing ample funds for this purpose.  Since Morgan County was not a captive county, there was also never at any recent time any state help to upgrade these signage deficiencies.   To fix this problem, it would be best to be handle this problem from a state level or regional level.  Could it be fixed from a local level?  Partially, but it's doubtful that the efforts would be enough to truly correct the issues.  It did appear some newer signs were more compliant, but that's not enough.

WHAT THE STATE SHOULD DO

It is very clear that Alabama needs to change its approach to county roads.  With counties and cities unwilling to consistently and effectively engineer and maintain roads, a greater state role is needed.  According to "Implementing the High Risk Rural Roads Program by the FHWA" on page 16 it states, "Alabama trained county engineers in data analysis and low-cost safety improvements. Alabama dedicates all HRRRP funding to qualifying municipal and county roadways. In the first year Alabama divided available HRRRP funds equally among the State’s 67 counties as they developed a specific procedure. In coordination with relevant stakeholders, including local agency representatives, ALDOT developed a process requiring county engineers to participate in data analysis and low-cost safety improvement training to qualify for funding."  If that is so, then why aren't the traffic signs in far better shape?  This Alabama approach isn't requiring them to do anything or show any results.  This program didn't really require any real changes at all.  A few small areas look to have been improved, but no major changes have been made with this program.  It also appears that Alabama has not really worked to identify these issues on a state level meaning it's up to the counties to regulate themselves.  In addition, the lack of a "qualified vendors list" for traffic signs does not provide any means for local agencies to screen private vendors.  Many other states have this, including Georgia.  These counties by and large appear to have used this funding for other issues not related to traffic control devices.  Neither are any quality controls in place for those local agencies assigned with this task to assure that the best materials are being used.

Community Lane just west of Gum Springs Road in the northern part of the county did not disappoint with terrible signs.  The Stop Ahead sign and the reverse turn sign both have undersized, incorrect symbols on posts only about 2' off the ground.  While the conditions are correct, the signs are not.  The reverse turn sign should also have an advisory and either chevrons or arrows on the turn ahead (which it does not).  (Google Street View, June 2014)

A start would be for Alabama to carbon-copy Georgia's "Off-System Safety Improvement Program".  This program requires little to no local investment, demands state standards are followed, uses state forces to identify problem areas and takes this work out of the hands of local engineers.  Some GDOT districts have also hired private engineering firms to conduct traffic studies for these safety projects meaning that roads in many, many counties that have never before had any traffic study nor were in compliance with MUTCD standards have been able to have their safety issues corrected to where they meet or exceed standards found along state highways.  By privatizing the process, Georgia took the work out of the hands of counties who were not doing the job right.  While Georgia's county road agency structure is different from Alabama's, the state finally understood that technical issues are best addressed outside the scope of local politics at least for the purpose of distributing federal funds for safety improvements.  Georgia's approach by no means has been a cure-all nor has it necessarily corrected local maintenance deficiencies after projects are completed, but it gives local governments a chance to do something well that they were unable to do very well before by showing them how to do it the right way and making sure that funds are spent in a way that brings local signage into compliance with state and federal standards.  How well these are ultimately maintained in the future, however, remains to be seen as currently no structure is in place to provide statewide or regional traffic control services to local governments.  This latter situation is quite similar to Alabama, but the former situation has placed Georgia well ahead of Alabama.

South Cedar Cove Road transitions to North Cedar Cove Road in what is a sharp turn even less than 90 degrees.  With that much of a hazard, the only thing posted is an undersized and non-standard turn sign (no advisory) and two chevrons stacked at one point in the curve.  If nothing else, large arrows should be stacked and better warning signs should be posted.

The curve in question from Google Maps

In addition to centralizing federal-aid funding, the best strategy by far is the development of a regional traffic control district.  This can either be a decentralized model based on planning regions or a centralized one that operates as a local arm of ALDOT.

Regional Traffic Control District: Planning Region Option

The first option is to take traffic control out of the hands of the county engineer and replace it with a more centralized program where traffic engineering is a multi-jurisdictional operation jointly funded by multiple counties and cities across a larger region.  It is important to note that the region is very rural and that by itself that Morgan County would still not have adequate population coupled with its own planning region (North-Central Alabama Regional Council of Governments), but if combined with the NW Alabama Council of Local Governments, this would bring the region up to eight counties with a population exceeding 500,000.  Could Morgan County then afford a PTOE?  Of course.  If every county and city participated, the cost of a PTOE would be less than $10,000/year for Morgan County alone!  The idea is that a regional traffic control operation separates that responsibility from the county engineer so that resources can be pooled enough to fund an agency whose sole purpose is traffic control planning and maintenance.  Clearly the county is not able to do it alone, but when coupled with so many other cities and counties, a benefit that was lost when the "captive county" program was eliminated will not only be given to Morgan County, but will return to five of the counties in the region that used to be part of the captive county system up until 1979.

This top-down approach would create an umbrella regional agency operating as a superlocal division of state government whose sole responsibility is traffic control for multiple counties and cities large and small allowing resources to be pooled to a point that a "state within a state" would replace ineffective and substandard traffic control like this.  However, the fact that such an approach is untested means it will be difficult to establish.  Will a bunch of neighboring counties be willing to share a service like this?  This is why this was not offered as the only strategy.

Nearby to Cedar Cove Road, Gum Springs Road has this infamous combination of speed limit doubling as advisory sign and curve sign screw-up like what was seen on County Road 55 (Google Street View, June 2014).

Regional Traffic Control: State-Administered Option

Another option to consider would be using the state government to make this happen.  This can be done one of two ways:

• The Contracting Method: An individual county or city basically pays a fee to ALDOT to have the state administer their local traffic control program. 
• The Statewide Cooperative Method: The state legislature or state DOT sets up an umbrella agency separate from ALDOT where local agencies pool resources to provide statewide oversight of local traffic control by becoming "members"

Both plans in the second option have in common an operations fee, but on either plan the state can finance the operations alone and can thus waive the fee allowing poorer counties to avoid any excess costs to fund professional services.  In the planning region option, the operations fee cannot be waived, because the operations are self-funded by every member local agency.  In contrast, the state-administered option has the operations fee dictated by ALDOT with the fee used to add on any necessary employees, equipment or facilities to the existing state operations.  Any additional funding provided by the local agency must be returned in kind by the state in labor and materials.  The second plan is basically functions like a bank in that each participating local agency is a member and deposits money that can only be used on their roads.  However, this "bank" has an operations fee which is used to finance facilities, equipment, staff engineers and other employees whose sole purpose is to plan and maintain traffic control on local roads in all member counties and municipalities.  If the state decides it is able to cover it, that would remove all barriers to poorer rural counties, right?  ALDOT would not own this agency, but would be provided some regulatory oversight.  The second option would most likely require the creation of an elected position to keep the activities of the cooperative accountable to the voters.

On Option 2, the important thing to consider is the potential for permanence in such a situation.  Would the state commit to this plan long term or ax it when the budget got a little too tight?  The cooperative model is more stable, because it operates outside the realm of ALDOT or the legislature.  In addition, the idea with either plan is not to shun the private sector.  For instance, in the ALDOT plan the strategy would most likely be that the state plans all traffic control and requires local agencies to purchase from a list of qualified private vendors pooling resources for any large purchases.  The state may provide certain materials at a price to the local agencies such as guide or route signs, but the majority of signing materials would come from private vendors.

What drivers actually see approaching a long S-curve with a hidden intersection in the curve on County Road 55 eastbound approaching Patton Rd. (Image from Google Street View, June 2014)

 

What drivers should be seeing.  The signs in this image were added to the street view image slightly further west.  Advisory speeds were not included in this image since it is unclear what they would be if used.  A W16-8 street name sign was included underneath the W2-1 cross road sign for Patton Road and Moses Road so that drivers would not have to slow down to read the street names in a curve.  Yellow "signposts" were used to make them more visible in the image.  A close-up of the W16-8 sign is shown here for better visibility.

Here is the area shown on Google Maps.

Here we have OZ Davis Road east of Old Eva Road.  A local connecting road, it has a very sharp reverse turn with no signs whatsoever approaches travelers westbound at the end of a 3/4 mile bee line.  Having an appropriate independent engineering study would locate and correct missing signage like this.  Since no speed limit is posted, this is essentially a basic speed law road.  (Google Street View, June 2014).

Area in question along OZ Davis Road.  The trailers visible in the Street View image above are in the lower middle of the aerial image for reference.

In another case here, a dangerous curve with a hidden intersection passed it is noted on Nat Key Road and not even marked at all.  The latter image took the Street View image and added appropriate warning signs designed to be at proportionally correct heights.  Some specific ALDOT standards were incorporated as well such as the object marker under the arrow sign and the oversized advisory speed sign.  The yellow posts are not specifically ALDOT standard, but are used to show how these could be yellow-painted for greater emphasis. (Google Street View, June 2014).

Aerial image from Google Maps showing the sharp curve and intersection as shown above.  The image is just east of the sharp curve on Nat Key Road with Gibson Road in the middle.

Summary of the Two Plans

In all options, the county's direct involvement in planning, designing and installing traffic control devices is eliminated, but this does not necessarily mean local funding is eliminated.  What changes is the management of the devices entrusting it to authorities better trained and suited to handle such matters with a more disciplined approach to engineering standards.  It is clear from these images that enforcement of MUTCD standards is not a priority for the state, but if the responsibility was centralized to a certain point, it would create conditions where instead of the liability falling on the county or state, it would fall directly on a licensed PTOE whose career is on the line if the signs are not designed and maintained correctly.  This is the only enforcement mechanism, and this needs to be done: traffic control should be placed with an authority whose SOLE PURPOSE is traffic control and who has a vested interest in making sure it is handled the correct way every single time.  Morgan County is not doing this, and apparently they have little vested interest in the quality or consistency of traffic control.  Unfortunately Morgan County is one of many counties and municipalities across the nation with this attitude.  Public safety is simply not important enough to invest heavily in traffic control, and part of that is that nobody on a county level seems to understand the problem well enough.

County Road 55 in Eva has this completely incorrect speed limit sign in Series B.  Eva is a city, but mostly contracts road maintenance to the county.

County Road 55 east of Nat King Road has yet another Series B speed limit sign that appears to be 1 foot too low considering the sign is down slope from the pavement.  The original and then the correction (fake) is posted just below it.  (Google Street View image, June 2014).  

The above sign, also on County Road 55, is even worse and is in disrepair.  It is located west of Union Hill Church Road.  Except in the instance of a kangaroo court, this sign cannot even be enforced if found to be defective, because it is not considered a traffic control device.

The last one is the worst one.  Not only is the speed number smaller than the words "SPEED LIMIT" but the sign is also barely two feet off of the ground.  This one is located on Indian Hills Road north of Bethel Road in the NW part of the county.  

Bridge rail issues are pretty typical in low budget states with a poor safety investment.  While an interesting historical novelty, it should be pretty clear from the damage on both rails that these antiquated designs pose a serious hazard to motorists.  The two safety plans proposed on a state level should help better fund corrections to this.  The first is on Robinson Creek Road over Flint Creek.  Two other bridges to the north are low-water bridges with no railing.  The second is on Nat Key Road over Robertson Branch.  Strangely the county does not seem to have as significant issues posting object markers on bridges as they do with other signs, but the posts need to be leveled out to be more effective.

At this location on Robinson Creek Road just west of Appleton Road, pipes run close to the roadway without any adequate safety devices in place to warn drivers that they could drive off into the creek.  A flood gauge is also needed here seeing that this is a low area.   This road is otherwise unpaved.  (Google Street View, June 2014).

However, none of these plans can be brokered without broader support from the state legislature, key local officials and/or discussions among many counties and municipalities that evolve into a regional and/or statewide agreement.  Like every other county in the state, local authority for routine maintenance would transfer to regions pretty much eliminating issues like those that exist in these images.  On the second and third plans especially, Morgan County would no longer have any excuse for the deplorable condition their traffic signs are in.  With the expanded purchasing power created by sharing this responsibility and professional expertise available to point out problem areas, the funding available would be more than sufficient to correct every deficient sign within 5-6 years even without any any federal funding used.  Essentially the situation with the defective and incorrectly engineered traffic signs is not just a failure on the part of the county, but also the state to not provide any dedicated funding, programs or oversight to make sure that local efforts were matching state efforts.  This plan is designed to correct that.

What drivers see as they approach the CR 73/35 junction in Eva on CR 55 westbound.

What they should be seeing.

The curve above in Eva is actually a very sharp left turn where CR 55 turns at Morgan Drive to junction with Eva Road (shown here as CR 35).  The signage is clearly negligent considering that this is a sharp turn left needing an advisory, turn instead of curve sign, large arrow signs, a stop ahead sign and a junction route assembly for the approaching county highway.

The "curve" here is actually the beginning of a winding road on a downhill section of County Road 55 westbound.  Most likely the county did not have a winding road sign that day when it came time to replace it.

The last is on Nat Key Road marking a very sharp winding road section where another "drunken" winding road sign without an advisory speed marks the curve.  (All images from Google Street View image, June 2014).

WHAT THE COUNTY SHOULD DO

Traffic signs like you see on these roads make driving these roads significantly more dangerous especially in adverse weather conditions such as rain, fog and during the nighttime.  Morgan County could do much better, and the county could and should do this with or without any cooperative efforts.  In all, they should take a multi-faceted approach to correcting this problem with or without any state help at all.  Here are the most steps the county needs to take with or without the development of a cooperative region:

1. The county needs to consider consolidating the county's traffic sign program with the county's seven cities. This will help to pool resources so that safety work can be coordinated, costs can be reduced, facilities can be consolidated, equipment purchased more cheaply with standards subsequently raised.  This could also open the possibility for the hiring of a PTOE and development of a countywide traffic operations unit allowing the county engineer to focus on other matters.
2. The county commissioners need to recognize that this is a big problem creating substantial local liability. 
3. The county commissioners should redirect funds into a significant investment on a local level to fix these problems.  This includes the hiring of a private engineering firm to perform traffic studies on all federal-aid eligible roads (arterials and collectors) that are under county control followed by remaining paved roads with costs to be spread over a five year period.  These studies need to identify the proper locations and types of warning, regulatory, guide and route signs needed.  Traffic studies should include roads in cities where Morgan County is responsible for road maintenance such as Eva.  HRRP funds should be used to finance this part of the process.
4. Morgan County needs to budget at least 2% of the county budget for traffic safety improvements until all traffic signs and pavement markings are brought to state and MUTCD standards.
5. Morgan County needs to adopt ALDOT standards for traffic signs, guardrails and pavement markings on all county-maintained roads.
6. Major reform is needed in traffic sign standards.  Employees need to be formally trained in proper design, installation and maintenance of signs according to the MUTCD, Standard Highway Signs manual and state standards.  Post height needs to be corrected, signs need to have correct dimensions and symbols and fonts need to match drawings in the Standard Highway Signs manual.  This is a training matter that does not require a full-time engineer.
7. The fabrication of signs in-house other than street name signs should be suspended until newer and better equipment is purchased.  This new equipment should have all proper fonts, MUTCD signs and plotting equipment.  An independent PTOE should review and recommend materials purchased.
8. Vendors who have sold traffic signs that fall below MUTCD standards should no longer be used.  It needs to be recognized which signs are not correct with signs removed as soon as possible.  If possible, the county should request from ALDOT a qualified vendor list.
9. The original statewide county highway system should be re-established in the county with routes posted along major county roads.  Numbers should match those as assigned originally by the state.  These should be signed within city limits of cities and towns using county funds (e.g. County Road 55).  
10. Directional and distance guide signs should be installed at the junction of major county routes with other major county routes and state highways.

The above shows yet another county error.  It's possible the city of Eva paid for these guide signs even though the county otherwise maintains their roads.  While they are genuinely helpful, they are non-compliant, difficult to read and in a poor location.  The image below shows what is needed instead, and the Google Earth edited image below shows how the intersection should be laid out based one direction.  Guide and route signs like this are needed county-wide along major county roads like these.  (Google Street View, June 2014)

The annotated drawing here with aerials from Google Earth relates to the images above.  This shows the needed route and guide signs along major county road intersections.  Both roads shown here are major collector routes.  Also note that CR 35 is shown as CR 73 on the ALDOT functional classification map but likely was originally CR 35 when the state-numbered system was still intact.

Many other counties and cities across Alabama have adequately addressed their sign issues simply through sufficient interest from the county engineer.  It is unfortunate that Morgan County has not taken this approach.  It is hoped that the county commissioners will see this and take the steps necessary such as these recommendations here to review and overhaul the county sign program.  While the county sign issues need specialization from a PTOE and traffic operations unit, at the very least some smaller steps can be taken to improve on what is already there by simply reviewing existing conditions and comparing them to MUTCD standards.  Instances such as a post height of less than 5 feet, typical signs that do not match Standard Highway Signs manual, a winding road sign for an obvious reverse curve and omission of signs in obviously hazardous conditions are all conditions that are simple to fix and do not require an engineer: they only require a commitment from the local government and local authorities to identify and replace.

CONCLUSION

Morgan County was chosen for the spotlight to highlight that issues with MUTCD compliance (traffic control devices) do not necessarily relate to either population or even access to professional engineers.  Morgan County has the population and funding to do a far better job than they're doing, and this is why requiring counties and cities to have complete control of this and other safety improvements that typically require the supervision of a licensed traffic engineer with a PTOE certification endangers the traveling public and constitutes a misuse of public funding.

This was a longer post to highlight that a local hands-off approach is not an effective solution even if counties and cities are provided with engineers and have the population to do it.  If 50% of the counties in the state do a good job and the other 50% are not, then why should the 50% that are doing it correctly bother if the others can do as they please?  Fixing the problem is not even about punishing the "good" counties: it's about recognizing that a failure in even one county or municipality constitutes the need for systemic reform.  It also highlights the weaknesses of self-policing when it comes to public safety.  While ALDOT or the legislature stepping in might better fund this problem, the only real way to put teeth into local practices is to remove the supervision of this responsibility from the local governments itself placing it instead with regional cooperatives who are able to do it well.  Nonetheless, counties and cities statewide can also do this themselves by realizing that local control is not always best when it comes to routine maintenance thus combining that responsibility into a statewide cooperative to pool resources, consolidate purchases and improve engineering standards.  Traffic safety devices are not a "small part" of road maintenance.  They are a very big part and should not be mishandled just to pave an extra road or two.  This post highlights the problem while recognizing that the problem is deeper than just the local government: it recognizes that this is a function best handled when that responsibility is handled collectively across many jurisdictions in order to establish adequate resources and supervision.