Lessons Learned from Alabama's Captive County Fiasco: Advice for Virginia, North and South Carolina

Sometimes the best laid plans fail.  It is not from lack of results or lack of effort, but usually these plans fail because either just enough people are not happy with the results of that plan or the approach taken is not fair to all parties involved.  While the storm has quieted down at present in Virginia over devolution of its state controlled county road system, the battle still rages in South Carolina where the state has strongly considered devolving responsibility for at least half of its current state-owned road system mileage as a means of forcing counties and cities to fund roads that are not federal-aid thus are lower in regional importance.  While fair skies permeate the Mid-Atlantic states at the moment for state-controlled county roads, the devolution threat still looms in the coming years.  North Carolina's roads are also slipping in pavement quality, and Virginia still has a long climb back after neglecting to fund its road system prior to 2012.  Another outbreak of devolution mania is likely to ensue with neither North Carolina nor Virginia able to adequately meet the demands of these two fast growing states.  Although at least 35% of the roads are in poor condition in all three states, that doesn't mean the same bad idea used in 35 other states does not need to be adopted in these states.

Roads such as Simmons Gap Road (Rt. 628) pictured here in Albemarle County, VA have an uncertain future in terms of the state continuing to maintain their roads.  The debate over the state's role in what would otherwise be a county maintained road in other states is never over as long as states fall behind on maintenance and roadway improvements.

THE CAPTIVE COUNTY STORY: A LESSON IN FUNCTIONAL CONSOLIDATION FAILURES

Alabama's "captive counties" were born in a period of progressive fiscal policy where state involvement in local road maintenance was much higher than today.  While Alabama has larger counties than many other Southeastern states, these counties are still low in population and have a high percentage of residents with lower incomes.  How "captive counties" began was in the 50's when corruption on a local level was very rampant.  Instead of a countywide road structure where all road maintenance was centralized in one single unit, counties were continuously splitting up road responsibility across special road districts.  The result was that these counties began to accrue massive debt.  At the time, the state felt that the only strategy that would work was to take complete control of the worst counties thus unifying the counties' road responsibilities under state authority.  All equipment, facilities and employees were then seized by the state and the newly "captive" counties were required to pay the state their share of highway user revenues (known as a "bookkeeping fee") to maintain roads in their counties.  A portion of that fund was used to pay off the debt with the remainder used for the state to maintain county roads.  These captive counties also made the cities within captive meaning that all roads in the county taken over by the Alabama Highway Department (now ALDOT) included those within the municipalities Alabama Highway Department.

A map of the controversial "captive counties" in Alabama

When the state was through seizing its picks of captive counties, the total was 10 counties although one source has stated there were once 13 captive counties.  These ten counties included 9 in Northern Alabama and one in Southern Alabama.  The ten counties were Lauderdale, Colbert, Franklin, Winston, Lawrence, Cullman, Jackson, DeKalb, Cherokee and Baldwin.  Most counties were seized by 1955 with Colbert County seized in 1965.  When the counties became "captive", the status was always left open-ended to allow for an eventual return to local control after the debt was paid.  After that was accomplished, voters would decide via a referendum whether to "free" the counties to maintain their own roads.  A funny thing happened, though, in that this penal strategy for corrupt counties became popular: especially with county officials.  People began to see that the state was doing a better job than the counties were able to do for routine maintenance and subsequent referendums were not resulting in the turning back of those roads.  

The existence of captive counties was controversial from the start.  It was joined by a Dillon's Rule culture that made the state directly responsible for county needs, and even the "free" counties received maintenance from the state.  It is not known if there were voluntary contracts, but it does appear that aside from the 10 captive counties, that several other "free" counties still contracted part or all of their road maintenance services to the state at-will.  All of this irked many who believed that the system was patently unfair giving financial advantages to "free" counties, and this was enhanced by strong home rule advocates such as former governor Fob James.  Lauderdale County fought the hardest to reform the system, and a referendum was put forth in 1963 asking voters to take back their roads not even a decade after the system was adopted.  Moreover, the state did not permit counties to make any decisions or have access to funding on county roads captive to the state, and it was commonly said that funding formulas were placing captive counties at a disadvantage.  This was worsened by the cheap construction techniques used to pave captive county roads.  The system was dominated by roads paved with nothing more than a thin layer of double surface treatment (tar and gravel) that, while an improvement over dirt roads, got into bad shape quickly.  

 

With the state unable to raise revenues adequately to improve the worsening road conditions, the fight escalated 20 years after the system was created.  This imbalance of funding remains an issue today in the states that control county roads: the counties are either unable or unwilling to raise funds to help advance state work.  Some exceptions do exist in several counties in Virginia, however, who have created construction agreements that speed up road projects that would otherwise go unfunded.

In 1975, Lauderdale County came up with a solution for the Captive issue.  The way the system was structured gave no control to the counties in how money was spent.  The county proposed limiting the role of the state without being required to take over maintenance.  The idea was that the state would cede financial and planning authority for construction to the county while continuing to provide maintenance thus keeping the county "captive".  A similar strategy has been considered more recently in Virginia and South Carolina, and this common sense solution has continuously been shot down by legislatures and state DOT's absolutely and stubbornly hell-bent on devolution.  It was a sound solution that could have saved the system, but the idea slipped through the cracks.  State Senator James Lemaster was fighting on a different front pushing heavily for full local control to fix the substandard roads that were falling apart.  His strategy would ultimately prevail.  For some reason, the hybrid solution with the state providing routine maintenance only while the counties otherwise plan and construct as they choose has been nearly impossible to execute: perhaps due to unclear authority for the roads and the ease in which the state could dump that responsibility if they are only responsible for what amounts to essentially patching potholes and putting up signs.  Apparently high standards and real government efficiency absolutely constipate modern state governments who prefer chaos and passing the buck. 

So much for good ideas, of course.  Four years later, Governor Fob James expressed fiery opposition to anything but home rule for counties.  With enough support in the state senate, the counties were coerced into a compromise that resulted in the return of the captive systems to the counties.  For about a year, the state and county squabbled about how equipment, employees and facilities would be transferred and after an agreement was reached all 10 counties regained control of their roads.  Problem was that except for wealthier and more populous Baldwin County, the captive counties were mostly poor, rural counties.  This transfer of authority to the counties gave them more freedom, but it led to a definite decline in roadway standards.  These "free" counties were not able to magically provide the good roads that the local control advocates continued to champion.  In fact, road quality did not improve much at all until the late 1990's and in fact got worse.  In addition, the maintenance of traffic control devices worsened dramatically and has never returned to the levels it was when under state control.  ALDOT has also not been as consistent with signage given that they no longer have costs streamlined with more efficient processes that they did in the 70's.  Issues like this are completely ignored by home rule advocates who fail to address that most counties are structurally incapable of providing the same high standards, frequency of maintenance and uniformity from county-to-county that the state was able to provide and that the states suffer from highly fragmented road responsibility that lowers frequency and quality of maintenance on state routes.

This 2004 photo of County Road 275 in Cherokee County shows a typical rural "captive county" road.  Although this road pictured was a primary state route from 1971-1980, it was never improved from when it was a county road.  Note the terrible condition of the road, signs, lack of safety improvements and rough pavement condition long after this road was deeded to local control.  This road was not fixed until 2008.

Neglect of traffic signs remains a pretty common issue with roads in the former captive counties.  The counties have been either unwilling or unable to maintain traffic signs to the levels they were maintained under state control.  Everything was transferred to a local level whether the counties could handle it or not.  

Economies of scale and high standards are always the casualty of fragmenting road responsibility.  10 year maintenance schedules are replaced with 20 year ones.  More expensive and better materials are removed and replaced with cheaper, lower standard ones.  Professional expertise is lost and replaced with a small number of employees with little to no engineering support and very little oversight.  The roads start looking neglected, and the weeds get taller as the poorer counties are not investing in weed and brush control the way the state did.  A poorly run road agency almost never gets set straight, and this means that from county to county, maintenance is highly unreliable compared to a centralized system.  In the 1930's, it was well known that decentralized road systems were like this, but somehow that topic has disappeared from modern discourse.  Nevertheless, the return to local control did offer advantages in terms of pavement conditions especially as statewide revenues today do not keep up with demand and local governments were then free to use local sales and property taxes to pave roads, but should road quality be sacrificed for this?  Why can't we have it all?  Good standards, good roads.  Additionally, the state today provides far less to counties than it did in 1979.  In the late 70's, the state/county funding split was 45% state/55% county.  Today it is 80% state/20% county.  This change in role in terms of financing of roads is a likely reason the state abandoned its efforts, and this is also a reason that a return to full state control would not be possible nor practical if funded from a state level like it was before.  

CAPTIVE COUNTIES REVIVAL

The fatal error with captive counties was the refusal by the state to provide local financing options for road construction and maintenance improvements beyond state revenues.  If that issue had been resolved early on, quite possibly this road system could have been rescued and the home rule advocates would have not had a platform.  The view in 1955 was that counties were supposed to be relieved of all duties for roads by using only state forces and revenues, but that strategy failed as the state was steering funds away from captive county governments for other reasons coupled with a sharp decline in the state's spending power within that same time period.  The idea was that property taxes would no longer have to be used for roads in the initial North Carolina strategy, but the inadequate nature of state revenues proved that unless state taxes were raised very high that it is not possible for the state to adequately maintain county roads without significant local financing.  

Nevertheless, the fight was not over.  Many in the state legislature were fans of the captive system and thought it should be brought back for all but the most populous counties.  Despite the devolution tide of the 1970's, a very serious proposal was put forward in 1985 to take over all county roads in all counties except those with a population of over 100,000 residents.  That bill had mixed reviews, but it primarily had some pretty strong opposition from counties that had never before been captive.  The main opposition was that commissioners in the formerly "free" counties felt that the state had not done a good job in the captive counties nor were they doing a good job maintaining the state routes.  They did not trust the state and felt that their roads were in better shape than what the state could provide.  In truth, these county commissioners were both right and wrong at the same time.  This brings us to the issue of roads today in Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina but for the purpose of this post we will focus on Virginia.

VIRGINIA'S 93 CAPTIVE COUNTIES: A SIMILAR STORY WITH AN OUTCOME THAT COULD BE JUST AS DISASTROUS

Virginia's road system today has a lot in common with the captive counties in Alabama.  The state's secondary state highway system does not define its counties as "captive", however, since the vast majority of roads of this class are under state control.  However, the distinction is the same.  While the "captive" counties include all but two counties, these two free counties have a known financial advantage from the state in terms of funding per mile and access to local financing.  This is not lost on the other counties, especially the more populous ones, who basically have their hands tied and are unable to raise enough local revenues to make up for what the state is not providing.  It is truly depressing to cross from a secondary road onto a Henrico County road and see a narrow, pothole-filled chip sealed road widen into a smooth asphalt road with wide lanes.  Of course, what isn't considered by the home rule champions is the fact that both of these counties do not share any revenues with municipalities, have a massive sales and property tax base, and have much greater populations than these other counties.  Instead of forcing counties to take over the roads, why aren't they allowing every county to raise local funds to repair and construct roads that are then handed over to the state to maintain?  While some regional sales tax reforms have been created helping greatly, it is still insufficient to address the huge backlog of work that is needed.  Although the gas tax was raised, it is going to take a lot more to get the roads right.

In Virginia, the state has not kept up with modern traffic demands.  Until 1986, counties were forbidden from investing any resources into new road construction relying entirely on the state.  This put fast growing counties at a severe disadvantage by not allowing them to fund new road construction when state revenues were not sufficiently addressing substandard road conditions.  While counties across the state have been allowed more flexibility in terms of funding road improvements above what the state has offered, what the state has not provided is a dedicated and plentiful funding source for counties to use independent of the state.  The result has been a very low local investment in roadway projects while the state has done little to nothing to improve the secondary state roads.  Secondary state roads are still "local" roads.  If the counties wish to improve the roads beyond what the state provides, they should have a means of raising money to do so since they actually use these roads and thus directly experience hazardous conditions.  

Things came to a head in 2011 when the state of the secondary roads got so bad that the number of miles in poor condition jumped to around 50%.  This was a direct result of the state's low gas tax that was not adjusted for inflation and had not been raised since 1986.  State revenues continued to decline resulting in the continued deferment of maintenance, and most of this deferment was on the state's secondary system.  State funding for secondary roads fell to zero in 2012, and the former governor Bob McDonnell enthusiastically proposed a transfer of both construction and maintenance of all secondary state roads to the county governments.  His proposal was hotly contested leading to a compromise that ultimately led to an increase in taxes through wholesale gas taxes (replacing the excise gas tax), regional sales taxes and an increase in fees.  The result of this compromise was that the state's secondary system was at least temporarily rescued from devolution, but this road plan is still a band-aid that is not healing the problem, and ultimately gas taxes and other fees still had to be raised.  State funding is still not adequate to cover all local needs, and home rule advocates are still waiting like for the opportunity or a vocal political advocate to obtain a wide enough support to overthrow the centralized road system and replace it with 93 different road departments, mostly with shoddy standards.

Roads like this one in Loudoun County, VA need a lot of work.  While this road is functionally local, the fact is that the state is not providing enough funding to repave, repair or rebuild roads like this.  While the county should not be expected to take over maintenance of roads like this, local revenue sources should be expanded to assure that local matters are properly addressed.  However, Loudoun has proved capable of providing funds for construction that have made it possible to fix roads like this one (it was paved and realigned recently).  This does not mean, however, that Loudoun is capable of caring for those roads on a routine basis the way that VDOT does presently.

These two roads in unincorporated Falls Church are under state control, and they show how serious the backlog of maintenance became prior to the 2012 legislation.  The first road has since been repaired, but the second is still awaiting funding for repairs.  While the state is slowly catching up from zeroing out secondary road funds in 2012, it is not likely that roads in this condition will continue to be tolerated by county and state residents if funding does not remain adequate for maintenance.  The first is Wilson Blvd (Rt. 613) and the second is Peyton Randolph Drive (Rt. 2325).  While Wilson Blvd. was finally resurfaced early in 2015, this image demonstrates the difficulties that state politics can have on road funding.  Similar roads in nearby Arlington County where the state does not control county road maintenance are in better condition, but quite a few roads in Arlington are still in rough shape.  While having Fairfax County take over road maintenance is not being advocated here, the county having its own funding sources to repair roads like this when state revenues fall short are definitely necessary as a means of continuing a centralized road maintenance strategy.

The question was again placed on the ballot in the governor's race in 2013.  Ken Cuccinelli's platform was to turn all secondary state roads to the counties.  Terry McAuliffe's was to keep the road system as it is with more funding.  The very close race resulted in the anti-devolution candidate winning the election, and he has recently pushed for a further gas tax increase.  However, Virginia's governors only serve one term.  The next election could easily result in a political conservative similar to Cuccinelli succeeding and thus again pursuing devolution.  If Virginia is going to pursue devolution, the Commonwealth should consider a better strategy than his full-scale graduated transfer plan.  Several options are discussed in the proposals section of this blog.

 

A NOVEL OPTION FOR VIRGINIA COUNTIES TO RESCUE THE SECONDARY SYSTEM

 

Devolution doesn't have to be to the counties.  It can just be transferred to another large highway agency.  Let's say that in this next election that Youngkin becomes governor and devolution is something he is hell-bent on.  The counties don't have to take it.  They have an option before it's too late, and that is a counter-proposal to create a statewide cooperative that essentially "receives" the secondary roads.  Call it the "Virginia Local Roads Commission" or "Virginia Regional DOT".  Unlike the secondary system, this will be a statewide DOT owned collectively by all of the counties and will work on their behalf to oversee all construction and maintenance essentially keeping the secondary roads and not forcing counties to take on engineering and maintenance individually.  This can even be managed privately in lieu of setting up a statewide office for it like VDOT.  It can be a win-win that will set a precedent.  The cooperative, if broadly participated enough, could be drilled down into four units: a rural statewide one and one for Greater Richmond, Hampton Roads, and Northern Virginia as long as the population of each exceeds 1 million residents.  This fits into the regional roads plan in that the roads of regional importance vs. statewide importance are still centralized, but they are funded and managed separate from the primary route system.

WHY VIRGINIA'S STATE CONTROLLED SECONDARY STATE SYSTEM WILL FAIL IF IT IS NOT REFORMED

It is important to consider that Alabama's failed "captive county" program provides some lessons for Virginia. The lessons learned from Alabama's "captive counties" included the following:

• The state does some things better than counties and counties do some things better than the state
• State control of county roads does lead to better routine maintenance standards than what counties are able to provide, because:
• It is engineer-driven with engineers always making road decisions
• It has clearly written standards that must be followed
• Has a stronger organizational structure that better enforces standards
• Has high economies of scale and purchasing power allowing more expensive materials to be purchased in bulk and at lower unit cost
• However, states do not have the revenues or organization to properly fund road construction off of the federal-aid road network resulting in a construction backlog
• Significant local funding matches are essential to fund proper maintenance of roads off of the federal-aid eligible road network, and local funding matches are weak to non-existent in most counties
  
• State revenues alone are not enough to keep up with needed local road improvements resulting in deferment of paving and other road projects 
• Local governments need a guaranteed source of revenues to fund road construction, and those funds must be used only for transportation purposes on secondary state roads
• When local governments can chip away at the construction backlog and speed up completion of maintenance projects, state revenues will then be adequate for routine maintenance and maintenance costs will be manageable with less reactive and more proactive work
• Deferred maintenance has a snowball effect due to the much higher cost to replace failed roads
• A perception exists that the state is using state-controlled county roads as an ATM by diverting maintenance funds to pay for larger road projects due to a lack of transparency on how funding is spent
• The truth is that the state revenues are inadequate to maintain such a large system without a local funding source, and the result has been an extremely high amount of narrow, cheaply paved roadways that are hazardous for all types of vehicles
  
• Like Alabama, Virginia has given "free" counties an unfair advantage in state payments.  Captive Counties in Alabama were also shortchanged
• Payments to free counties should be modified with the condition that the counties provide routine maintenance of state-owned roads within those counties (excluding traffic control)
• Replacing local control with a regional system as a steward working on behalf of all counties would resolve this imbalance while preventing the 95 counties, 95 different standards problem
  
• Full state ownership of county roads potentially reduces the funding available for improvements on the primary state highway system unless state revenues are kept at a very high level meaning higher state taxes
• State DOT's use this as a justification for devolution in that they believe state-aid road funds should be primarily for roads of greatest statewide importance
• However, primary routes are still adequately funded in the consolidated system
• If state agencies feel this is the case, then the state should employ one of two options:
• The first is to steer secondary funds uniformly to all county agencies with the intention that the counties that want to remain under state control have the state retain that funding as an "operations fee" with the local governments given a receipt each year showing how that funding was spent
• The second is for the state to steer all engineering and maintenance responsibility to a separate statewide cooperative agency working on behalf of the counties and let each member county decide how to finance operations and maintenance
  
• This approach balances out the "unfair advantage" in the "free" counties
• Critics say state government is not accountable to county voters thus is more likely to ignore needs of a local nature
• States have actually been very good stewards to counties in a centralized system, and they have done as good as they can with limited funding creating a very high level of efficiency, but with inadequate funding they are unable to modernize the roads or resurface roads frequently enough
• Giving local governments extra funding options through local option sales taxes, local option gas taxes, impact fees and/or ad valorem fees that can only be spent on transportation are necessary to provide local governments a way to fund construction and speed up maintenance projects regardless of whether the state remains in charge of local roads
• This way the state is a partner to local governments instead of a large, remote agency sending state money elsewhere
• Giving local governments funding options is NOT intended to be a devolution strategy.  It means that the local government finances improvements that are returned to to the state DOT upon completion for maintenance

These lessons are on display today as Virginia's approach to state control has led to not only substandard pavement conditions but also substandard roadway construction.  Roadways across the state are very outdated in design with narrow lanes, little to no shoulders, poor geometry, unsafe bridges, flooding problems and poor drainage.  Many of these roads were paved in the 1940's and 50's and have recurring maintenance problems requiring far more frequent resurfacing to keep in good condition.  In urban areas, the state has not provided badly needed intersection improvements, traffic lights/traffic circles, lane widening, sidewalks or other needed upgrades to provide safe and well-designed roads that match the heavy traffic volumes.  These are typically needs more likely to be championed by the local government, and local governments already spend as much as they are capable on secondary road construction projects.  However, the states are generally unwilling to raise the gas tax statewide.  Some options Virginia could choose from to give counties leverage over construction include:

1. 3-5 cent local option gas tax increase
2. 1/2 to 1 cent sales tax
3. Impact fees on new construction (only useful in high growth counties)
4. Ad valorem taxes (not to be confused with vehicle property taxes)

State control of everything from interstates to cul-de-sacs is a problem, because it is essentially a commingling of funding for both highways and local roads with very different priorities.  The way around this is the partnership model whether it is:

• The state continues to manage county roads, but local funding is provided and employed to complete what the state is unable to fund directly essentially expanding what already exists in a handful of counties in the state
  
• County roads are managed statewide through a cooperative "regional" system, but separate and independent from VDOT turning "secondary roads" into "regional roads" where engineering and oversight never actually does transfer to the local level even if primary financial responsibility does
  

Otherwise, funding for statewide needs will always compete with local needs with too little done to mitigate safety problems, maintenance problems and traffic bottlenecks on local-level roads.  Overall, the possibility of any significant state investment in operational improvements on secondary roads is quite low while the counties by and large are not able to steer enough of their own resources to begin the long and expensive work required to bring these roads to modern standards.  In fact, the majority of road work funded by the counties comes in the form of new construction.  A hybrid approach is the solution for that.

Local Examples of the State-Local Hybrid Approach

With these options, the county would have substantial funding to construct and maintain roads, BUT that does not mean that they take over maintenance.  Consider if Fairfax County, VA used a 1/2 cent sales tax to fund widenings and roadway reconstruction, and raised a 3 cent gas tax to fund the operations fee to pay back to VDOT for maintenance.  This way, the county actually is "maintaining" the roads, but they continue to trust the expertise of VDOT for routine maintenance while enjoying the economies of scale available from using a cooperative approach with the state.  VDOT would still budget the same amount as they did to Fairfax County, but the county would fill in the gaps.  In essense, the state did raise more money, but they entrusted it on a local level with it transferred back to the state based on the needs of the county.

Consider Loudoun County, VA.  How is Loudoun different?  For one, they are heavily involved in construction and often use impact fees as concessions from developers to pay for significant road projects and other infrastructure upgrades.  Thus, the county has successfully kept up with growth demands in places of heavy new construction as historic trails have to be quickly realigned to accommodate suburban sprawl.  The problem is, most of the functionally local roads that the county is not fixing are still in very poor condition.  Loudoun clearly needs more money as they are faced with the need to rapidly pave hundreds of miles of gravel roads, reconstruct others and modernize the county to meet growth demands.

Roads such as this in Loudoun County were only recently paved, but state funding was inadequate for this project.  It was paid for mostly by county funds then left to VDOT for maintenance.  It is considered a "rural rustic road" thus the narrow lanes and hilly geometry.  The county has routinely had to pave to this lower standard due to lack of funds to properly reconstruct roads.

Images such as this scene in Loudoun County highlight the depth of the construction backlog.  The county still has a large number of gravel roads, single-lane low-water bridges and roads with poor geometry that need to be completely realigned, widened and rebuilt.  You can see the state did a good job of warning of the hazards this bridge presents, but when it comes to construction this and many other counties in Virginia need better access to local financing to modernize potentially deadly roads such as this one.

While the county still enjoys and has no interest in ending their partnership with VDOT for maintenance of local roads, the county clearly needs additional local funding sources to modernize roads that cannot be improved with impact fees.  What if they could raise a local sales tax?  The county has substantial retail including a popular outlet mall.  If Loudoun was able to speed up improvements and catch up with the state's massive backlog, maybe VDOT would have an easier time maintaining what is already there.  VDOT is clearly capable of providing the basic outfit (resurfacing of major secondary roads, traffic control maintenance and summer/winter maintenance), but they are not fixing many roadways that remain in poor condition, paving new dirt roads or reconstruct shoddy-built roads.  It is the county that is mostly doing this.  If the county was able to get the county's roads up to state standards, pave every dirt road and rebuild every road in poor condition maybe then VDOT's available funds would be sufficient to maintain Loudoun's complicated road system. 

HOW TO REFORM VIRGINIA'S ROAD SYSTEM: DEVOLUTION ALTERNATIVES

Nobody involved with roads in Virginia denies that the future of state control looks sketchy for the state's secondary highway system.  Obviously the 2013 compromise provided flexibility to the counties and improved state funding, but VDOT was already so far behind from years of deferred maintenance and construction that more is needed to catch up.  Cheaply built roads with poor drainage cost more to maintain, and a vast program is needed to not just better maintain the roads that are there, but also to do more to modernize roads in the more populous counties.

Secondary route reconstruction such as Rt. 603 (North Fork Rd) in Montgomery County to modern highway standards as well as improvements to non-federal-aid secondaries is needed at much higher levels than is presently occurring across the state.  This cannot be done unless a new local funding source is identified.

The vast sum of winding and extremely narrow roads is not just limited to rural counties.  Counties around Richmond, Northern Virginia and Charlottesville that have a much larger population also are full of these substandard roads, and these roads do have traffic volumes that justify reconstruction.  Counties such as Stafford have been using their own available funds to begin reconstructing secondary roads, but what they have been able to accomplish is still a drop in the bucket compared to what is needed.  Traffic volumes on major roads are worsened when the secondary options discourage through traffic.  Improvements to these roads are vital for safety and economic progress.  Voters and legislators are not likely to continue to tolerate roads with terrible pavement, poor sight distance and inadequate design for decades to come.  In fact, it seems that the only roads that the state does an acceptable job maintaining are the federal-aid collectors and arterials both primary and secondary.  However, turning roads to the county is a proposition likely to result in a sharp decline in engineering and traffic control standards in most counties across the state.  Much of Virginia remains rural and will not have the resources to maintain their own roads to state standards regardless of available funding.  In addition, urban counties are not always reliable in funding and maintenance of roads as is evidenced in Montgomery County, MD.  

The solution lies in an approach where the state's role is diminished but not eliminated.  What went wrong in Alabama was that the state's role was completely eliminated.  Instead of adopting Lauderdale County's plan of keeping the state for routine maintenance only, the state completely exited the county road business.  The 1985 state takeover plan also did not include a provision to limit the state's powers, thus why it failed.  The key word is control.  The state's control structure will only work if local governments have broader funding and powers in road construction and maintenance on secondary state roads.  This means that the strategy must change.  However, a strategy of cooperative services with the state handling technical services and routine maintenance on account of the local governments should never change.

Another post details the devolution alternatives for both Virginia and West Virginia with specific details.  It lays out the specific strategies that should be adopted

ROAD PLANS ON THIS SITE THAT ADDRESS THIS ISSUE IN VIRGINIA

The most ideal solution is to keep VDOT in control of the roads they have controlled since 1932, but to allow local governments the ability to raise their own gas or sales taxes to speed up maintenance projects and finance far more road projects than the state can presently afford.  It is clear that not only is much more needed with reconstructing roads, but also to create roads that are safer for both motorists and pedestrians.  Primitive, narrow and winding roads with heavy traffic are a hazard for everyone that uses them, and local governments should not have to beg for help when the state has so many conflicting priorities.  Give the local governments the option to fund more road projects, but do not punish them for doing so by forcing them to take over road maintenance.  If this is still not possible, then perhaps in more populous regions of the state it might be time to consider developing a regional road system like the ones proposed in the Regional Roads Plan.  Some other ideas that might also help to fix this imbalance are as follows:

• Traffic Control Cooperative Plan
• Loudoun County certainly demonstrates that the state does some things better than the counties and the counties do some things better than the state.
• Nowhere is this more true than with traffic operations
• Local governments as a whole are not financially nor structurally suited to handle this technical operation that is too expensive to correctly administer without high standards, without high economies of scale and without a specialized agency that has a PTOE supervising engineer
• Even if a county otherwise does an excellent job maintaining roads, they typically do a terrible job with traffic control
• This is why even if road maintenance otherwise is transferred to a local level, this specific state function should remain under state control or transferred to a cooperative with state funding.
• Statewide Contracting Plan
• If VDOT exits the county road business, this responsibility should not fall directly on the county governments
• Instead, interested counties and municipalities broker a deal to either allow secondary roads to transfer into a new state agency or to form their own interagency cooperative that handles secondary roads keeping VDOT as a contractor while the organization is being formed.
• The state could also step in and address the concerns of local agencies by developing a separate state agency to handle local roads or a joint cooperative among all interested partners needs to replace this that would keep roads consolidated, but separate them from VDOT
• The cooperative could co-locate facilities with VDOT, share equipment and operate as a statewide unit that just happens to be under the authority of the 93 counties formerly under state control.
• The idea is that if counties must take over roads that they will NOT be required to set up separate road systems in each county.
• This plan creates a balance and a safety net if the state forces the hand of the 93 counties across the state who have enjoyed relief from the higher costs associated with full local control
• Farm-To-Market Cooperative Highway System Plan
• This approach reduces, but does not eliminate VDOT's role of maintaining secondary roads
• VDOT keeps partial control of the secondary state highway system with state control reduced to around 35-45% of the road network
• Construction costs are passed on to counties and municipalities for all other roads
• All counties can either retain VDOT as a contractor at their own expense for remaining roads or form a regional/statewide cooperative that ultimately assumes maintenance responsibility for both local and farm-to-market roads
• Two-Way Consolidated Road Maintenance Plan
• A major goal in Virginia should be to keep the historic consolidated road system consolidated, but with reforms to provide a degree of local control that has not previously been available
• If all secondary roads are transferred to county authority for construction, that doesn't mean that the county and state should operate separately
• Obviously two counties both construct and maintain their own road systems and others may soon join them such as Chesterfield County
• If that's the case, then the counties should be given the same responsibility as cities: maintenance of state-owned roads
• Perhaps this arrangement could be set up like the Local Exchange Plan with the state providing traffic operations work on local roads in turn for the county providing all other routine maintenance on state-owned roads even if it is not a match dollar for dollar
• In this plan, either the county works for the state or the state works for the county.
• Populous counties would benefit consolidated local maintenance of county and state routes while less populous counties could retain VDOT as the exclusive steward of both state and local roads

SUPERVISION OF STATE AND LOCAL ROADS NEEDS TO BE RESTRUCTURED INTO A CO-OP MODEL

The idea that either a state or local government agency should have total control of their own systems without any overlapping of duties or sharing of services is an antiquated and inefficient concept.  Most states today are too large to handle all local matters while most counties and municipalities are too small to handle matters that the state handles best.  This is why the captive county system failed in Alabama and why Virginia's secondary state highway system is also in danger of failing.  Local control is not a bad thing as long as it is understood that local governments cannot handle everything on their own.  The whole idea of local control is to make sure that local funding stays at home and that how that money is spent is accountable to local voters.  However, this does not mean that local government is either responsible or efficient to the degree that it actually works that way in every case.  As was said before, we need to think regionally, not locally.   Thinking regionally means that the gray area is explored as a solution either with an overlapping service structure between the states and local governments or the development of a regional governance model for transportation that places significant road responsibility on a level above the county or municipality but below the state: in other words, a state within a state.

In all, the lessons learned from Alabama demonstrate that balance is needed.  Balance did not exist when the Alabama Highway Department (now ALDOT) managed the captive county roads, and balance does not exist today with the counties maintaining those same roads the state handled back then.  Local agencies need to understand that opposing a transfer to the local level will not be enough to stop it from happening.  Instead of ignoring the problem or turning back to the bad old days, local agencies are provided here with tools that give them the power to stop devolution by thinking outside the box for new funding allocation methods, new organization structures and elimination of the belief that local control on a county of municipal level is the solution to a construction and maintenance backlog.  Other local agencies in decentralized states also need to understand that they can enact centralization by adopting a similar strategy to what is described above.  While it is generally the duty of a state to delegate responsibilities to local governments, time and history have proven that not all local agencies are the same and that what is best for some may not work as well for others.  Roads should not be fully centralized nor should they be completely local.  Both agencies need each other's help, and the best way to do this is to allocate the responsibility in a way that is the most beneficial for all parties.  

Curve Warning Signs: A Need For Better Federal Guidelines

One of the biggest problems with lack of uniformity in traffic sign application across the US has much to do with the inconsistent layout and maintenance of curve warning signs.  While a few states have more specific guidelines, the fact remains that the frequency of use of these types of signs and application varies from state to state and even more strongly varies on roads maintained by local governments.  Across much of the US, it is not uncommon to find few to no curve warning signs on local roads and streets regardless of terrain or traffic volumes.  Sometimes populous counties and municipalities do a terrible job while some less populous rural counties are more thorough.  What is worse is that there are a very high level of jurisdictions who post these signs without any proper engineering study done to determine their correct usage and locations.  This means that actually having these signs in place poses a greater risk to the driving public than if no signs were installed at all.

The list above shows most of the signs that need better nationwide standards.  Federal guidelines need to be expanded to push for not only greater state oversight but a more clear and consistent method of application that balances traffic volumes and funding.  

The rules when it comes to posting curve warning signs, chevrons and arrows are more clear than they once were but that has not exactly changed state and local practices everywhere.  Here are the typical rules for curve warning signs according to the most recent MUTCD:

• Curves are supposed to be laid out so that curves/turns are marked as reverse curves/turns or winding roads if the distance between two or more alternating curves is less than 600'.  Note that this rule usually requires some flexibility in mountainous conditions where a winding road has one or more curves that is sharper than others in a series of curves or turns.  
• Curve warning signs with advisory speed signs are mandatory when a curve or turn is determined to require traffic to slow 10 MPH or more below the posted speed limit to safely maneuver
• Turn (W1-1) and Reverse Turn (W1-3) is supposed to be use when a curve has a posted advisory speed of 30 MPH or below.  Exceptions usually are noted on roads with already low speed limits such as roads posted 40 MPH or below.
• Advisory speeds are also required to be determined using a ball bank reading, design speed equation (usually determined when a new road is being designed) or combination of ball bank meter and accelerometer.  The results of the advisory speed study determine if a curve should be signed and the type of curve sign to use (curve/reverse curve or turn/reverse turn).  The technology to determine advisory speeds has improved making this work easier and faster than in the past, but it is not being done consistently
• Chevrons (W1-8) must be spaced evenly based on the advisory speed posted from beginning to end of the curve (a table describing the required distance between signs was added in the most recent MUTCD).  For instance, a curve with an advisory speed of 35 MPH requires 120' spacing.  
• Chevrons may be posted only on the outside of a curve or turn.
• Two chevrons must be in view in all times when mounted in a curve or turn from beginning to end of the condition.
• Either chevrons or large arrow signs (W1-6) are mandatory on all curves and turns that have an advisory speed of 15 MPH or more below the posted speed limit.
• A licensed civil engineer is required to either oversee or conduct studies to determine locations of all curve warning, chevron and arrow signs (in addition to other signs).

Typically these are the common engineering deficiencies related to each point listed above:

• Improper Usage:
• Reverse curve/turn and winding road signs installed when distance between two or more curves or turns well exceeds 600'
• Curve or turn instead of reverse curve or reverse turn used when distance between curves is under 600' (sometimes on each curve)
• Use of W1-2 curve instead of W1-1 turn for a 90 degree or acute angle turn when speed limit is above 30 MPH presenting a special hazard to motorists who may not notice the lower advisory speed due to suggestion the curve is less sharp than it is.
• Lack/Excess of Curve Signs:
• Curve warning signs are not posted at all when a curve requires slowing to 10 MPH less than the posted speed limit
• Curve warning signs are posted when a curve is too gentle to require any signing and/or speed reduction.
• Inconsistent application is not uncommon: especially when knockdowns are not replaced
• Lack of documentation of curve sign locations meaning signs are forgotten about
• Improper Advisory Speed Study:
• Advisory speeds are frequently "determined" using methods that are based on nothing more than field observation by non-engineers or untrained technicians.  
• This involves basically just driving the curve and getting a "feel" for the curve.
• These non-technical measurements are likely to lead to incorrect advisory speeds creating a hazardous situation for motorists, because one employee might "feel" that a very slow speed is a safe speed for a curve while another "feels" that a much higher speed is safe.
• The variation in field observation based on "feel" will lead to drivers ignoring underposted advisory speeds while excessively high advisory speeds can cause a vehicle to leave the road.
• Incorrect Posting of Chevrons/Arrows:
• Chevrons are often posted in a manner not conducive to MUTCD standards such as posting them in the fashion of arrow signs, posting only one in a curve or turn or posting them in clusters on only one part of the curve.
• Chevrons used where object markers or diamonds are required
• W1-6 arrows used improperly in the fashion of chevrons
• Lack of Supplemental Required Chevrons/Arrows
• Many, many curves and turns with advisory speeds 15 MPH or more below the posted speed limit lack any chevrons or arrows
• No prior speed reduction with W3-5 and R2-1 to adjust speed limit in hazardous curve area so that chevrons/arrows are not required when advisory speed is otherwise 15 MPH or more below the typical speed of the roadway
• Lack of Staffing on a Local Level for Curve Sign Studies
• Most local agencies lack the resources to hire, even as a consultant, a licensed traffic engineer just to conduct traffic sign studies.
• While the state may assist in this matter in state or federal-aid projects, there is nobody on the local staff properly trained to identify and correct errors or conduct traffic studies.
• States will not provide traffic studies for the local governments without charging as much as a private consultant
• This is how these errors become common.  Some states do have state-funded county engineers, but this is no guarantee that the county engineer is actually handling traffic control matters as evidenced by the prior post about Morgan County, AL.  

This curve sign marks a 90 degree turn on Cox Street in Eden, NC.  A city-maintained street, the city has posted an incorrect advisory speed sign, a curve sign instead of a W1-1 turn sign and no large arrow in the turn despite the road ending straight ahead.   This highlights common engineering deficiencies on a local level.  (Aerial image from Google Maps).

Laying out a proper curve warning sign plan is the most technical work in traffic control proving to be even more complicated than guide and route sign assemblies especially when working in mountainous conditions.  In addition, maintenance management of such signs is difficult.  Here is what is typically required to maintain these signs:

• Data and Documentation:
• Extensive documentation must be kept of sign plans with a dedicated replacement program to identify and replace worn out signs, stolen signs and knockdowns [records kept by transportation agency]
• A GPS database is needed showing sign locations, identifying their condition, age, location and MUTCD sign ID's
• Traffic Studies:
• Every public road, not just state roads, are supposed to have a traffic study conducted by a licensed traffic engineer with a traffic engineer thus overseeing work after sign projects are completed to make sure that signs remain consistent, none are missing and all meet MUTCD standards
• Few local agencies have this or can afford to have a dedicated traffic operations unit headed by a PTOE to make sure this is done
• Engineering Errors:
• Care must be taken to correct engineering mistakes such as signs placed in the wrong location, the wrong sign used or signs that were not identified in traffic studies (e.g curve posted in only one direction)
• These errors typically require someone with special knowledge on how to identify these errors meaning either state traffic operations must have supervisory authority on local roads or a regionally-funded PTOE must be hired full time to oversee roadways otherwise maintained by multiple local agencies since a single local agency lacks the resources for this
• Attention to Accuracy and Detail:
• Signs should be replaced correctly so that a W1-4 reverse curve sign is replaced with just that and not a W1-3 reverse turn or W1-2 curve sign
• Speeds Must be Accurate and Safety-Based
• Advisory speeds must be set correctly based on proper engineering studies
• To avoid excessive use of signs on very winding roads, speed limits should be adjusted lower in areas where an unusually high amount of curve warning and chevron signs would be required otherwise  
• Deferment of Traffic Control Supervision to a Larger Agency:
• A local agency that lacks a staff engineer or its own traffic operations unit should be able to defer that responsibility to the state DOT or partner with other cities/counties in the region for that purpose, but this rarely happens.  Note that the MUTCD recommends the latter.
• The first calls for state contracting, which most states refuse to provide to local governments while the second calls for regional services which are not available in most states.

WHY THESE SITUATIONS WITH INCORRECT CURVE WARNING SIGNS ARE SO FREQUENT

Local governments clearly have the most difficult time properly managing a curve warning sign program, but even states have difficultly managing this work despite having multiple engineers and years of experience available to handle this task.  Part of this is due to the cost of this work and the fact that non-engineers are typically not allowed to perform these operations on their own.  A lack of a certified traffic control technician as a legal position has hampered the ability to address issues on miles of local roads due to the shortage of qualified engineers available to do this work.  County and municipal engineers usually need trained assistants or traffic operations units to help them with the management of this work since a county engineer's load is usually too heavy to properly oversee day-to-day traffic operations.  This is why more than likely this work falls on an employee without adequate training or any certification to handle traffic operations.  Anybody that works in traffic operations should be required to enter an intense training program taught as a year-long course.

After the creation of this field, only civil engineers with the PTOE certification or licensed traffic control technicians will be permitted to do this work with nobody else permitted to plan, design or install traffic control devices.  Obviously, the licensed traffic control technician (LTCT) will have some limitations in that they will not be permitted to design larger structures such as sign bridges or any other overhead structure, but otherwise they should be capable of handling those responsibilities on condition that they are able to handle the math requirements.  The license means that like an engineer they would be personally liable for not following proper engineering protocol.  Breaking off this work from civil engineers placing the responsibility on a licensed non-engineer would make sense as a way of lowering the cost and raising the output thus raising standards.  By doing this it would be possible for traffic control operations to be overseen by someone whose entire position involves collecting data, analyzing data, creating sign plans and then using a GIS database to store the records of that work with a legal requirement that is as binding as it is for the PTOE.  A licensed traffic control technician would work under direct or indirect supervision of a PTOE and would typically still require a civil engineer to review all work plans.  If working for a local government without an engineer on staff, the LTCT would be under supervision of the state's district engineer.

Overall, the extremely high amount of situations where this work is non-existent or incorrect shows how difficult this is to manage and is a major reason why State and Local Road Reform believes that most local governments are not well suited to handle the engineering and maintenance of traffic signs independent of a state agency or regional government unit.  One of those reasons is because local governments were largely laid out based on antiquated principles, especially county and township government.  The layout of most counties, small towns and townships was not done with any consideration of the high costs and organizational structure needed to meet modern transportation demands.  Modern transportation demands cannot be effectively met without high economies of scale, people who know what they are doing and the benefit of adequate tax bases: both usually well above what the typical county or municipality can provide.

In addition, the author believes that states need a better policy to handle this work.  Some or even most states do not have a written policy on how to manage the installation and maintenance of curve warning signs.  This leads to situations where roads are oversigned well above the level of risks present or traffic volumes.  Many situations exist where curve signs are posted in places where sight distance is clear and no speed reduction is required even if the driver is 5-10 MPH above the posted speed limit.  Those resources could be better distributed to other sign needs if sign clutter like this is removed.  In fact, the only instance where signing a gentle curve makes sense is where a very straight road has a bend that requires driving at a speed 0-5 MPH below the speed limit, which is typically not high to require an advisory speed.  Otherwise, it not only diminishes the importance of other signs while making maintenance more difficult and costly, but also it becomes less likely that the truly dangerous curves are properly identified both by highway agencies and motorists.  For instance, a W1-5 winding road sign might be posted for a situation where one curve requires no speed reduction while two other curves are sharp turns requiring a speed drop to 20 MPH below the posted speed limit.  A driver might not take the situation as seriously seeing a gentle curve, take the first curve fast and then crash on the second curve.  Similarly if a series of curves are signed that do not require any speed reduction then a driver is less likely to notice signs posted for a curve that require slowing down to safely navigate.  

THE SOLUTION ON A FEDERAL LEVEL

Further in this post a plan will be described that details how roadway classifications, traffic volumes and overall functions should be added to the MUTCD as a means of correcting extremes in curve warning sign policy ranging from too many signs to not enough signs.  Overall, the federal government needs to be a better steward of traffic sign policy on both a state and local level.  While the federal government does not have an iron clad way of policing bad traffic sign engineering practice, they should begin to hold states liable for this work not only on the state's own road system but also the local road system.  If the state has not developed an effective strategy to permanently correct traffic control deficiencies including curve warning signs on local roads bringing them in substantial uniformity with MUTCD standards, then this will need to change.  While all signs need to be in substantial compliance, focus is badly needed on proper curve warning sign engineering.  Since the public and many states do not recognize the importance and technical nuances involved in this type of work, the federal government needs to have more authority in this area.

The best way to do this is to define safety improvements as a substantial amount of federal-aid given to states.  Currently the federal government has some limited funding for this program, but it may be necessary for the federal government to begin to primarily fund traffic control devices to assure that states and local governments are installing and maintaining these devices correctly.  Funding would be distributed to states to be divided between the state and local governments for traffic control devices.  This funding, however, will be based on ratios of state control.  This means if a state has 10% under state control and 90% under local control, then the state must spend 90% on local roads and 10% on state roads.  Using the ratio method assures that states do not feel pressured to transfer roads to local governments as a means of raising and distributing funding.  The ratio simply changes with the level of state control.  This also puts less pressure on states to finance traffic safety work entirely on their own.

However, this federal funding must come with a catch.  The federal funding to be used on local roads may not be distributed directly to local governments.  It must be handled exclusively by state agencies and engineered through either state forces or private engineering firms hired by the state.  Signs used on local roads must be purchased through state-approved private vendors and meet state standards with the states becoming liable for not just installation but also maintenance of these signs on local roads as long as federal funding is provided for continued maintenance.  While the entire duty for traffic signs will not fall on the state governments, this new responsibility will require that state governments require local governments to meet the same specifications on anything they install thus creating a mechanism that states police local governments or else they will be required to handle that responsibility for local governments.  This federal funding clause will also force local governments to organize traffic control cooperatives with other counties and cities as a way to properly finance and supervise traffic control when today the federal government generally ignores local government actions.  Either way, the funding should be at a level to assure that local governments who are incapable of providing technical services on their own are provided a means to pool resources to either the state or regional level.  States that fail to properly manage this federally-funded work for local governments and follow MUTCD standards will also risk losing all federal funding unless conditions are met to acceptable federal guidelines.

On federally-maintained roads and roads in the District of Columbia, a slightly different approach should be taken where one of three things occurs:

1. DC contracts traffic control with an adjoining state or neighboring local jurisdictions to form a larger regional body that includes parts of adjoining states.
2. Authority for traffic control shifts to the US Army Corps of Engineers
3. Authority shifts to another federal agency that can oversee this work in a manner similar to a state government.

THE SOLUTION ON A STATE LEVEL

A federal solution is not necessary if state governments take the initiative to handle this responsibility correctly on their own.  The solution for a poorly executed curve warning sign policy will require that states take one of two approaches:

1. A Contracting Approach
• States select individual roads annually in every county (or entire counties) for a review.  They  hire a private engineering firm to study these individual roads, including both state and local roads, to determine where there are missing signs (also including intersection warning signs) and to identify that hazardous curves and turns that require speed reduction
• The state will either provide funding to the local agencies to install the signs according to the study or provide the results expecting the local government to fund the install based on the review within a 2 year span
2. A Consolidation Approach
• This involves the frequently discussed approach of using state forces or special regional cooperatives to provide this service on behalf of the local governments so that all errors and emissions can gradually be identified and corrected
• The consolidation approach includes routine maintenance while the contracting approach requires periodic projects and updating of prior work to occur at least once every 10-15 years

Either approach will require sweeping reforms, and the cost of upgrades will be costly.  The consolidation approach will not increase costs, but for conditions to improve in a shorter time frame additional funding will be required.  The contracting approach, however, will require a significant annual investment from both state and federal funding.  Using these findings this means that at the very least many existing curve warning signs will need to be:

1. Modified if information is correct, but is displayed in a non-standard way
• e.g. R2-1 used instead of W13-1
2. Removed to reduce clutter if signs are excessive
3. Corrected if existing condition is wrong or outdated
• curve used where reverse curve is needed
• modify existing W1-2 and or W1-4 to W1-10 signs for intersections found in curves
• 24" curve signs used
4. Installed if signs that are needed are missing
• curve posted in one direction, but not the other
• chevrons/arrows are needed in curve
• sign locations are identified in studies, but none in the field

By removing excessive signs from the roadway, the state or local government will be able to better finance the signs that they have while promote safer driving conditions.  This is because hazards on the roadway will become more readily noticeable because the number of signs will not overwhelm the driver.  It should also be noted that these state roads refer primarily to roadways in states where fewer than 20% of the road network is under jurisdiction of the state government.  In states with larger state road systems, the lesser secondary routes should be reviewed based on roadway conditions and functional classification for the purpose of better distributing state resources in regards to curve warning signs.  

THE SOLUTION ON A LOCAL LEVEL

It was stated earlier how the local conditions are far more serious than those on the state roads, but the need for curve warning signs is very different from state highways.  Most state highway systems carry higher functional classifications in addition to the bulk of traffic while local roadways usually only carry heavier traffic in either more populous areas or on longer rural collector roads that are not otherwise maintained by the state.  Other local roads are often shorter, carry less traffic and often do not serve through traffic.  Regardless, the fact that local conditions vary means that it is far more difficult for local governments to properly budget and develop an effective curve warning sign program when they are responsible for a far higher percentage of roadways of all different classifications.

With no clear rules on the best approach based on traffic volumes, roadway characteristics and speeds, to a local agency it appears that every winding road and sharp corner needs curve warning signs when the budget for that work is simply not there.  The result is that local governments typically either neglect the issue or take a very half-hearted approach.  These are the questions a local government often might ask themselves:

• Should we install more signs than they can afford to maintain or do they take a modest approach and leave most roads void of any curve warning signs?
• Should we install and maintain signs well below MUTCD standards because having anything there is better than nothing at all?
• We are a mountainous area, so should we post any curve warning signs at all?  
• We don't have the money for traffic studies, so should we just randomly post winding road signs on mountainous roads?
• Should we only post a curve sign where a previous accident occurred?
• Should we spend a million to fix every sign when there is no way we can afford to maintain that many signs?  

This is how most rural roads in many states ended up with few to no curve warning signs at all while curve warning signs issued through state-aid roadway projects during the 1960's and 70's ultimately were left to rot by those same local governments within those same states states.  This is especially true in those cases where small, low population local agencies were in charge.

No matter how that question is answered, the truth is that on a local level that local governments typically have not been consistently successful at handling curve warning signs.  Many avoid any corrective action fearing high costs and greater liability to maintain a high cost sign maintenance program even when terrain is flat enough and roadways are straight enough that the cost is far more manageable.  When budgets are primarily only large enough to post stop signs and a few street name signs every year, an investment in thousands of warning signs that did not exist before on roads that do not carry state highway traffic is not a popular idea.  Instead of hiring a traffic engineering firm to help correct deficiencies, these local governments often rely on in-house employees with little to no actual experience with that line of work.  A more dedicated employee given a larger budget might do a better job, but the evidence that no traffic study was ever undertaken is evidenced by common errors similar to the list of engineering deficiencies above.  Below are some examples with photos: 

• Incorrect curve sign used (e.g. posting W1-2 curve signs with no advisory speed for sharp 90 degree turns where a W1-1 is required)

Leman Rd eastbound at JE Waters Rd in Emanuel County, GA has this incorrect curve sign posted in the advance of a sharp 90 degree turn.  While the signs were state funded it is unclear who is responsible for this engineering error.  (Photo from Google Street View, March 2014)

• No advisory speeds posted on any curve signs

S Cedar Cove Road meets N Cedar Cove Road in Morgan County, AL at a 135 degree turn.  This turn sign includes no advisory speed to indicate how fast this turn should be taken.  (Photo from Google Street View, June 2014)

• R2-1 speed limit signs used to indicate advisory speed where W13-1 signs are supposed to be used

Old Federal Road in Murray County, GA (since corrected via an off-system safety grant) has speed limit signs used in place of advisory speeds.  It is unclear whether that is the actual speed limit or the advisory speed for the curve when this is done.

Old TN 68 in Sweetwater, TN features another instance of this practice.  Is the speed limit 20 MPH or do I need to slow to 20 MPH for the curve?

• No identification nor replacement of missing curve signs

Welty Church Rd in Washington County, MD is posted at 35 MPH but includes this S-curve that has no advance warning that likely requires a 10 MPH speed reduction.  (Photo from Google Street View)

• Incorrect advance placement distances (sign too close or far from condition)

This curve sign in Floyd County, GA has no advanced warning.  Also note the chevron signs on the incorrect side of the roadway.

• Non-compliant devices (e.g. incorrect design or dimensions)

This winding road sign and advisory sign violates MUTCD standards in every way.  The dimensions of the winding road symbol are wrong and the advisory speed plate has both incorrect fonts and incorrect dimensions.  This is found on Old US 441 northbound in Rabun County, GA.

• Improper use of signs (e.g. "Dangerous Curve Ahead")

Although later corrected with a state grant, this sign was used to mark a sharp turn in Fannin County, GA in the late 1990's.

This sign was discovered last fall on Steve Tate Road in Dawson County, GA.  The winding road sign in the background is also incorrect and too close to the curve.  It is actually a reverse curve/turn.  This sign is useless and should be replaced with the proper curve sign and advisory.

• Incorrect chevron placement (e.g. chevrons do not follow through on curve, chevrons are on wrong side of the road or only one chevron is posted in a curve)

This curve on Edgemont Road north of Mong Road in Washington County, MD has incorrect chevron placement.  Note that while "two are in view" they do not follow through from beginning to end of curve.  Note the two chevrons in the opposite direction.  (Photo from Google Street View, September 2012). 

• No chevrons or arrows posted at all in a curve that requires a speed reduction of 15 MPH or greater from the posted speed limit
• Signs are dirty, old or not mounted correctly

Misty Meadow Road northbound north of Watery Lane in Washington County, MD has a very old and worn out reverse turn sign (Photo from Google Street View, August 2012).

Stinking Creek Road in Campbell County, TN is a typical example of a rural county with no budget for curve warning signs.  Most curve signs posted on this road were installed when the road was originally paved by the state.  All but a few are gone including this arrow sign above and reverse curve sign.  (Photos from Google Street View, April 2014).

The issues above are not uncommon.  Because of this, correcting curve sign deficiencies on a local level will require a top down approach that expands beyond single state-aid sign projects.  Traffic sign studies are prone to errors and omissions that go unnoticed while most local agencies are not equipped to maintain a larger number of traffic signs.  Unfortunately, most rural governments are not going to fund either the installation or maintenance of this kind of effort on their own.  

Obviously the best approach for maintenance is to transfer traffic sign engineering and maintenance of all warning signs, but especially curve warning signs, either to the state or to statewide regional engineering districts to handle this duty.  It is also important to create a method of signing these roads based on actual need.  A functionally-local, low speed, low volume rural road in a mountainous area is not going to need to have 500 curve warning signs, chevrons and arrows when the budget is not sufficient to allow it and a lower speed limit or the identification of a few particularly hazardous curves would be sufficient.  In many cases it would be best to have nothing at all.  When far too many signs are in place, the ones most likely to find these signs useful on very lightly traveled roads are vandals who will steal them, use them for target practice and/or spray paint profanities while local or state authorities will likely forget they are even there.

These unnecessary signs create a greater liability to whatever agency is in charge of that road.  Setting the speed limit to reflect conditions would be a far less costly strategy or simply adopting a "drive at your own risk" strategy posting a sign like "No Curve Warning Signs" with a plaque reading "Next X Miles". Inversely, this does not justify setting speed limits artificially low just to avoid posting curve signs.  Speed limits should be set based on either roadway characteristics (majority of curves cannot be safety driven over 35 MPH) or prevailing travel speed.  This means posting an arrow straight two mile long rural road at 25 MPH just because of a single 90 degree turn halfway through is not the intent of this policy.  Likewise, residential streets, unpaved roads and low speed roads do not need the same investment in curve warning devices that roads with higher speeds require.

A "No Curve Warning Signs" sign could be adopted by either the states in their own MUTCD supplement or the federal MUTCD as a means of alerting motorists that they are on a lightly traveled road whose traffic volumes are too low to dictate the use of curve signs and thus must be alert for alignment changes that are not warned.  This sign should be used with a "NEXT X MILES" plaque.

However, a major collector road with low traffic volumes and a 35 MPH-55 MPH speed limit presents a different situation.  There is a potential of non-local traffic, higher speeds are present and the likelihood of hazardous conditions will require longer reaction time.  With roads like this typically better constructed, they are less likely to be oversigned yet still have a higher risk of accidents due to wildlife entering the roadway, traffic entering from hidden driveways, different roadway conditions (e.g. lack of shoulders or narrow lanes), less light during evening and nighttime hours and a lower expectation by drivers of encountering other vehicles.  Obviously driver error due to poorly engineered or maintained curve warning signs is also a frequent factor in these accidents as drivers leave the roadway due to inadequate or incorrect information.  Since speed limits are often statutory and not actually based on design speed or conditions, it is important that curve warning signs are consistent, uniform in practice and accurately display the needed information to help drivers adjust their speed for hazardous conditions.  

The table below lays out a curve warning sign plan.  This is a suggested method to use, regardless of jurisdiction, where a state or regional agency dictates how and where curve signs are laid out as a means of keeping consistent, uniform and well-maintained curve warning signs on the roads where they are the most needed.  This will also make it easier for states to develop a strategy to aid local governments.  

The table above describes the conditions that should be considered for curve warning signs designed to unify curve warning sign standards nationwide across multiple jurisdictions and states.  At present there is no uniform approach taken from state to state.

OVERALL CRITERIA FOR THE NEW CURVE WARNING SIGN POLICY

The table above shows the new method proposed for determining curve warning sign locations along roadways based on the criteria of functional classification, traffic volumes (using population density when traffic counts are not available), posted speed limit and roadway surface (paved/unpaved).  This policy dictates that curve warning signs are placed on roadways based on actual need regardless of ownership.  Thus, drivers will come to expect that a roadway that lacks these signs is smaller, more lightly traveled road while a roadway that has these signs is a through road or has heavier traffic.  States can then set budgets more effectively to determine the amount of resources needed to cover traffic control devices while local governments will be more willing to work with states if their resources for warning signs are concentrated on roads that carry higher traffic volumes or are more important.

Creating an environment where more qualified employees exist to address traffic control needs would be helpful to improve curve warning signs as well as traffic signs everywhere.  The current model of restricting this work to licensed civil engineers is clearly not effective given that most agencies cannot afford the cost required to hire a full-time engineer or engineering firm to do this work nor are the available engineers able to budget adequate time to this type of work.  A licensed traffic control technician could help to focus efforts on an employee whose primary task is to handle traffic control work requiring a lower cost to hire than a civil engineer.  This would help to bring more employees into the field with the knowledge and expertise to properly recognize, design, correct and install traffic control devices.  

Obviously, this policy should be coupled with the strategies presented on this site.  States need to not only reform their own policies but also preferably take over traffic control engineering duties for local governments unless a regional multi-jurisdictional regional structure can be adopted.  No matter what method is adopted, the typical local agency lacks the financial capabilities to properly oversee or fund this type of work and it is shown by the inconsistency and the enormous amount of errors in regards to curve warning signs.  Such a program would be far easier to execute if states would not blindly assume that local governments that are already not doing an acceptable job are going to follow the recommendations above unless they do this themselves.  This will, however, help states to better manage available state and federal-aid funds by concentrating funds on qualifying roads while not wasting resources on unnecessary signs.  

Three plans proposed would help to easily steer resources to cover the cost of correcting and maintaining warning signs as part of a uniform policy on both state and locally-owned roads.  They are:

• Traffic Operations Cooperative Plan
• This engineer-driven approach creates the ideal conditions for unifying standards and creating uniform policy by removing primary responsibility for traffic control from the local agencies and transferring it to regional cooperatives or the state DOT
• Two-Way Consolidated Road Maintenance Plan
• This plan creates conditions where local control of traffic control is limited only to local agencies with the population and resources to adopt this strategy with additional heavy state-aid funds while entrusting the state DOT or regional cooperatives to handle all of the other roads across the state
• Local Exchange Plan
• This plan frees up resources available on the state level to gradually chip away at traffic control deficiencies by allowing the state to transfer resources typically used for labor-intensive maintenance work to technical work thus allowing the state to make incremental changes based on state DOT policy, which would likely include this new curve sign policy

However, state agencies can only do so much.  The only way to assure a uniform and effective strategy to correct the currently ineffective curve warning sign methods is to create a more detailed nationwide policy that better explains to states and local agencies how to prioritize the installation and maintenance of warning signs.  They can, of course, exceed these standards but this approach provides the best balance for resources between urban and rural areas while preventing roads that are sparsely traveled from being oversigned.